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ABSTRACT
South Pacific Destroyers: The United States Navy and the Challenges of Night Surface Combat
in the Solomons Islands during World War II
by
Johnny H. Spence, II
During the South Pacific campaigns of World War II, the United States Navy faced a formidable
challenge in waging nighttime surface battles against the Japanese Navy. In a war that
emphasized the carrier and battleship, the little destroyer became a key player in these actions.
By studying this campaign from the perspective of the destroyers, three key factors emerge that
allowed the Americans to achieve victory: innovation in tactics, adaption of technology, and
efficient use of resources.
The research for the thesis was based upon action reports, oral histories, and other documents
obtained from the National Archives, Naval War College, Naval History and Heritage Command
Center, and East Carolina University. The Japanese perspective was attained from numerous
secondary sources.
Innovation in tactics, technology, and resources allowed the Americans to persevere through
severe defeats to achieve success against a very skilled Japanese Navy in the seas of the South
Pacific.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SOUTH PACIFIC, DESTROYERS, AND SURFACE COMBAT
As night descended on 8 August 1942, American and Australian warships took up patrol
positions per the orders of Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley of the Royal Navy. These ships
guarded an Allied invasion force that had assaulted Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon
Islands the day before. Off the northwest tip of Guadalcanal, the tiny volcanic island of Savo
split the western approach into two passages (see Map in Appendix). Crutchley assigned two
cruisers and two destroyers to guard the southern passage and three cruisers and two destroyers
to guard the northern passage. He also posted two picket destroyers farther west to provide
early warning of any approaching Japanese ships. Confidant in his defensive plans, Crutchley
left the forces to meet with his superior, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who commanded
the invasion force.
Shortly after midnight on 9 August, a Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer
commanded by Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi steamed undetected past the Allied picket
destroyers. Mikawa led his force counterclockwise around Savo Island pummeling the
American and Australian ships in both passages. Fearing a daylight air raid if he lingered too
long in the area, Mikawa withdrew his ships back to the Japanese base at Rabaul on the island of
New Britain. In his wake, he left four Allied cruisers sinking or sunk, one cruiser damaged, and
two destroyers damaged.1 Obviously, the Allies, particularly the American Navy, had much to
learn about nighttime naval combat.

1

Bruce Loxton and C. D. Coulhard-Clark, The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1994).

6

The Battle of Savo Island was the first of many nocturnal naval clashes fought between
the Allies and the Japanese in the South Pacific. These battles were part of a larger three
dimensional air-sea-land campaign fought to control the Solomon Islands, of which Guadalcanal
is a part. Each aspect of the campaign depended upon the other two dimensions. Both sides
needed aircraft and their associated airfields to control the surrounding islands and seas. Ground
forces had to defend and attack the airfields while naval forces kept supplies and men flowing to
key areas. Naval forces also ruled the seas during the dark of night when aircraft could not
operate effectively.2
In hindsight, it is easy to conclude that America’s industrial might assured them of
victory over the Japanese Empire. However, the reality of having to fight both Germany and
Japan plus the fact that American industry had not yet reached its full potential ensured that the
Allies would fight the Japanese on roughly equal terms during much of the Solomons campaign.
The Americans, therefore, could not rely upon a preponderance of power in arms, men, or
supplies to attain victory at this stage of the conflict.
The eventual Allied success in the Solomon Islands depended upon their proficiency at
warfare in the air, at sea, and on land. They faced challenges in all three areas, but the American
Navy had particular difficulty in winning the naval surface actions. Even though the naval
surface battles in the Solomon Islands involved other ship types such as battleships and cruisers,
the use of destroyers proved to be an essential key in winning these clashes. Due to their size,
availability, and versatility in accomplishing different tasks, destroyers participated in every

2

Description and analysis of the campaigns are contained in Richard Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive
Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Penguin, 1992), hereafter Frank, Guadalcanal; and Samuel Eliot
Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1949, 2001),
hereafter Morison, Bismarcks Barrier.
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major surface battle during the Solomons campaign. Their small size and speed made navigating
in the restrictive waters easier than for larger vessels. They thus had room to maneuver and
fight. Also, destroyers could perform a variety of combat missions including gunnery and
torpedo attacks. 3 Despite the American emphasis on gunnery, the employment of torpedoes in
these nocturnal fights would prove to be crucial. Because destroyers were the only ships in the
American Navy to be armed with torpedoes, they assumed a larger role than envisioned by
prewar planners. Eventually, destroyers evolved from being a supporting combatant useful only
in scouting and flank attacks to being a major player in these nocturnal clashes.
The destroyers that fought in these battles consisted of several different design classes
ranging from the Farragut Class constructed in the early 1930s to the newer Fletcher class
vessels that would arrive during the later months of 1942.4 A host of war planners, sea
commanders, naval architects, and engineers contributed their input to ship designs. Nearly
everyone agreed that the destroyers should be constructed so as to play a major role in a Jutlandstyle encounter between enemy battle fleets. However, they debated the details such as power
plant design, armament, and hull design. The debates produced a constantly evolving idea of
ship design that resulted in several classes being constructed. Employing different shipyards to
produce the same class of ship, the Navy also experienced slight differences within the same
class with regard to superstructure details and equipment configuration. As weaponry and
electronics evolved, the classes themselves were altered in periodic refits at a naval yard. Radar,
3

Discussions of the weaponry and missions of the destroyer can be found in Theodore Roscoe, United
States Destroyer Operations in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1953), hereafter Roscoe, Destroyer
Operations.
4
Details about destroyer design discussed in the next few paragraphs can be found in Norman Friedman,
U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982); and John C. Reilly, United
States Navy Destroyers of World War II (New York: Blandford Books, 1983). Students of destroyer design debate
the exact definition of some classes resulting in conflicting classifications for the same ship. In general, such
debates focus on technical details and do not affect analysis of the surface battles outside the general information
contained in the main body of the thesis.
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improved anti-aircraft weapons, and altered superstructures designed to improve load bearing
and seaworthiness changed some of the basic characteristics of the ship types. As a result,
differentiation between certain classes can be difficult.
Facing size restrictions imposed by the naval treaties, destroyers of the early 1930s had to
be constructed under 1,500 tons standard displacement (weight not counting fuel and boiler
feedwater). Vessels designated as flotilla leaders could displace 1,850 tons. Designers found it
challenging to meet the weight requirements while still maintaining the desired hull strength and
weaponry. Weight considerations often played a bigger role in gun and torpedo selection than
operational use. After the treaties expired, engineers had more leeway so later versions displaced
greater weight. The Fletchers had a standard displacement of 2,150 tons.
For the power plants, oil-fired boilers heated steam that powered rotating turbines that
turned the drive shaft of the ship and provided the ship with electrical power via a generator.
Engineers found that engines operating at higher temperature and pressure performed more
efficiently. In the quest for more powerful and reliable propulsion systems, different classes
often possessed different engines. In general, destroyers possessed two boiler rooms and two
engine rooms containing the turbines. Early designs used two stacks for exhaust gases. Wanting
to conserve deck space, later classes merged the exhausts from the two boiler rooms into one
stack. Designers soon realized that a single shell hit in the stack, however, could remove both
engines from service. Subsequent designs returned to using two stacks so a single shell hit on
one would not incapacitate both propulsion trains.
For weapons, destroyers possessed 5-inch guns, torpedoes, depth charges, and various
anti-aircraft guns. Designers envisioned the ships fighting against both surface and air targets so

9

they selected the single mount 5-inch/38 caliber dual purpose gun for use in most of the
destroyer classes. 5 Each ship possessed either four or five guns. Single mounts were used
because twin mounts would violate weight restrictions. Exceptions were the destroyers of the
1850-ton Porter and Somers classes which possessed four twin mounted 5-inch/51 caliber single
purpose guns. Designers envisioned these classes fighting against surface targets more than air
targets. In addition, the heaver weight allowance for these vessels allowed a twin mount so more
guns could be brought to bear on the target.6 Both gun types could be fired manually or in
remote control by a gun director. Early models possessed a Mark 33 gun director while later
classes had the improved Mark 37. Both models had crews operating range finders and an
electromechanical target computer. The crews fed enemy range and bearing information while a
gyro inputted roll and pitch data. The computer would then produce a targeting solution that
automatically trained the guns on target. It could also fire the guns as long as a firing key was
engaged. In this mode, the gun crews had only to load the gun. As soon as the breech closed,
the gun fired. If the director became disabled in combat, the guns would revert to manual
control, and the crews would train and fire the gun.
American naval doctrine considered the gun as the decisive weapon in fleet actions so the
battleships and cruisers lacked torpedoes. For a torpedo attack, naval doctrine relied upon the
destroyers; thus, every destroyer possessed a certain number of torpedoes. Torpedoes came in
triple or quadruple mounts. Depending on the class, they were mounted on the centerline or
waists of the ships. Centerline mounting allowed all tubes to be fired in one broadside but
5

Single purpose meant that the gun could be used only against surface targets because it could not
elevate enough to engage aircraft. Dual purpose meant the gun could be used against both kinds of targets. Many
designers believed that the single purpose was more effective against surface targets than the dual purpose.
6
Information on weapons taken from John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War II (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2002); Peter Hodges and Norman Friedman, Destroyer Weapons of World War II (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1979); and Roscoe, Destroyer Operations.
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targeting was complex. Waist tubes could only be fired forward or at targets on one side of a
ship but possessed easier firing solutions. As events would prove, these torpedoes became a
crucial factor in winning the nocturnal battles fought against the Japanese.
The destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy proved to be just as well-designed as their
American counterparts. In broad terms, the destroyers of both navies shared similarities in
propulsion, gun control, and overall ship design while specific equipment differed. Japanese
planners and designers strove to build ships that outclassed American destroyers in terms of
firepower in order to offset the disparity in ship numbers. The Fubuki class, constructed in the
1920s, set the standard for later models of Japanese destroyers. Armed with six 5-inch guns and
nine 24-inch torpedoes, the ships displaced over 2,000 tons and had a rated speed of 38 knots.
This class outweighed and outgunned the destroyers of both the British and American navies at
the time. The American Navy would not commission a destroyer in excess of 2,000 tons until
the Fletchers entered the fleet during the early 1940s.7
As with the American navy, the Japanese destroyer force consisted of several classes that
differed from one another in design characteristics while still adhering to general principles.
Most ships of the Fubuki class and afterwards possessed 5-inch guns and 24-inch torpedoes.
After 1933, the oxygen-propelled Type 93 “Long Lance” replaced the older air-driven torpedoes.
Along with this formidable weapon, most destroyers possessed a quick-reload system that
enabled them to rearm their tubes while underway which effectively doubled their torpedo
armament. Also like the Americans, the Japanese added more anti-aircraft weapons to the ships

7

Information on Japanese destroyers can be found in Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dieter Jung, and Peter
Mickel, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 130-152;
Anthony J. Watts, Japanese Warships of World War II (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 117-157; and Evans and
Peattie, Kaigun, 220-223, 251-252, 386-387.
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during periodic refits at Japanese shipyards. One class that differed from other Japanese
destroyers was the Akizuki class. Originally designed to be anti-aircraft cruisers, Japanese
shipyards constructed them as destroyers. As a result, they displaced 3,700 tons and possessed
eight 3.9-inch dual purpose guns instead of the normal 5-inch guns. They still carried torpedoes
and depth charges, however, and served well as destroyers. Another class, the Shimakaze, also
displaced over 3,000 tons, but only one ship entered the fleet before the end of the war. The
Japanese developed radar sets for use on ships, but they lagged behind the Americans in
outfitting their ships with the technology. In addition, these sets proved to be inferior to
American models.8
With regard to naval tactics, neither Japan nor the United States anticipated fighting a
campaign in the Solomon Islands during their prewar planning. Both sides had to make
adjustments to their strategic plans in addition to altering naval tactics and doctrine. On the
American side, the American Navy dominated prewar planning for the Pacific. Called War Plan
Orange, the Navy’s strategy evolved over the years to meet the economic and political realities
on both the domestic and international scenes. In general, the plan anticipated three phases. The
first phase called for the fleet to fight a holding action while America’s military and industry
mobilized. In phase two, the fleet would advance across the Central Pacific establishing bases
and pushing the Japanese westward. Eventually, a decisive battle would be fought somewhere in
the watery vastness of the Central Pacific in which the Japanese fleet would be defeated. Phase
three involved the siege and eventual capitulation of Japan. 9

8

Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 411-415.
An excellent survey and analysis of prewar American planning is the focus of Edward S. Miller, War Plan
Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), hereafter Miller,
War Plan Orange.
9
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Battleships played a key role in American prewar strategy and tactics. Other types of
ships had their roles as well, but naval planners believed the large guns of the battleships would
be the critical factor in achieving victory at sea. As a result, the Americans spent a lot of time
prior to the war developing fire control techniques, ammunition, and gunnery doctrine.10 The
devastating raid on Pearl Harbor and later logistical limitations on the supply of fuel oil,
however, kept the battleships from playing a key role in the early phase of the war.11 Other ships
such as carriers, cruisers, and destroyers would be crucial in defeating the Japanese at sea.
Once the war started, the Americans did not have the resources or bases to launch an
offensive across the Central Pacific. As the fight developed in the South Pacific, their desire to
seize the initiative from Japan as well as the availability of bases in New Caledonia and the New
Hebrides Islands made this area a key theater in the war. The geography of the Solomon Islands
meant that ships would have to sail and fight in confined waters and be wary of uncharted reefs
and shoals. The Japanese supplied their forces at night to avoid American aircraft that caused
the nocturnal naval clashes in which the Americans fared poorly. Thus, the Americans were
challenged to adapt their strategy, tactics, and doctrine to meet a situation few prewar planners
foresaw. Destroyers would be crucial to this adaption.
As for the Japanese, they anticipated an American offensive across the Central Pacific
and acknowledged that the American fleet would possess a numerical superiority. Their
planning called for destruction of the American Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines early in the war.
After this threat was removed, their Navy would meet the American main fleet somewhere in the

10

Trent Hone, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941,” The Journal of
Military History 67 (October 2003): 1107-1148.
11
David C. Fuquea, “Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet,
1942,” The Journal of Military History 61 (October 1997): 707-734.
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Central Pacific for the decisive battle. As the American fleet advanced, the Japanese hoped to
whittle away the American advantage in numbers by a series of raids upon the fleet. Once the
American Navy had been weakened, the Japanese main fleet would engage the American line
and defeat it. Demoralized, the American people would seek peace negotiations. 12
Night combat and the use of torpedoes played key roles in Japanese tactics. Arming both
their cruisers and destroyers with torpedoes, they envisioned vigorous nighttime attacks against
the American fleet. The cruisers would puncture the outer screen of ships while destroyers
would pour through the hole and attack the central formation of battleships. With such a
doctrine, the Japanese emphasized the development of night optics and the deadly Type 93
“Long Lance” torpedo which was superior to any torpedo in the American arsenal. 13
The Japanese did not neglect the battleships. As in navies around the world at this time,
they believed these ships to be the keystone of any doctrine. Prior to the war, they started
building the huge battleships Yamato and Musashi armed with eighteen-inch guns and a host of
secondary batteries. These ships were the largest battleships in any navy and the Japanese
believed ships of such quality would offset more numerous but inferior ships of other navies.14
As with the Americans, the Japanese also had to adapt their strategy and tactics to the
actual situation of the war. With their phenomenal success in overrunning Allied bases early in
the war, the Japanese decided to expand their defensive perimeter outward. Originally,
operations in the South Pacific were secondary in importance to others such as Midway. As the
battles for these areas intensified, however, the Japanese eventually realized that they were
12

David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese
Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 286-292, hereafter Evans and Peattie, Kaigun.
13
Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 220-223.
14
Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 370-383.
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critical to the outcome of the war. As a result, more forces were funneled into the South Pacific.
Due to Allied airpower and the restrictive geography of the Solomon Islands, the Japanese were
reluctant to risk their battleships in regular combat operations. They thus relied upon their
cruisers and destroyers to maintain their fight against the Allies. Fortunately for the Japanese,
the prewar emphasis on torpedoes and nighttime combat would be a big advantage for them.15
In addition to their ships, the Japanese would also rely on a national spirit that they
believed would give them the advantage in battle. According to them, this spirit included moral
superiority, willpower, and bravery. With such a spirit, the Japanese believed they could
overcome numerical and material deficiencies in order to defeat any foe. Although a boost to
morale, this spirit caused recklessness in Japanese military operations, including their naval
surface actions, which would do much to undermine their cause.16
A second critical factor in the surface battles was technology. Both the Japanese and
Americans relied on technology to provide an edge in the surface naval battles. Of course, this
technology included the ships themselves with the associated seaworthiness, power plants,
armament, and design. Certain key technological factors, however, such as radar and torpedoes
proved to be the crucial areas in which these battles were lost and won.17
The use of radar improved scouting, gunnery aim, and navigation. The Americans
researched radar throughout the 1930s and started equipping their ships with early versions
before the Japanese. However, the Japanese knew about radar from diplomatic missions to the

15

Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1978), 115-121, hereafter Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy.
16
Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 4; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 211-212.
17
Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 117-118,
hereafter Hughes, Fleet Tactics.
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Germans and quickly developed their own sets.18 Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese
did not effectively use radar until the Solomon Islands campaign had passed.
With regard to torpedoes, the Japanese Type 93 outshone the American torpedoes and
would prove to be the bane of the American Navy. The Type 93 possessed both excellent range
and reliability. The American Mark 15 torpedo, on the other hand, often failed to detonate, had
shorter range, and suffered problems with its depth settings. To make matters worse, the
Americans were tardy in realizing the threat of the Type 93 and the deficiencies of their own
torpedoes. They were slow, therefore, in developing tactics to offset the Japanese advantages.19
Overall, the deftness and creativity in which both sides used their technology would be
just as crucial to the naval surface actions as the number of ships and amount of weaponry. For
destroyers, both radar and torpedoes played a large role in combat proficiency. How Americans
adapted them to the situation in the South Pacific affected the outcome of the surface actions.
Finally, the use of resources was a third factor in the naval surface actions. Japan could
focus only on one naval theater of war, but it had limited industrial capability to replace ships
lost in combat. Because of this limitation, the Japanese had to be wise in the ways they deployed
and used their ships. During the Solomons campaign, America had not yet fully mobilized its
industry and faced both Germany and Japan, so South Pacific commanders had to fight the war
with relative few ships compared to later in World War II. Wasteful and inefficient handling of

18

Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 115; Louis Brown, A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military
Imperatives (Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999), 135-140, hereafter Brown, Radar History.
19
A good discussion of American and Japanese torpedoes can be found in Stephen F. Davis, “Perfect in
Every Respect: Battle of Vella Gulf,” Naval History 22, no. 4 (August 2008): 26-33, hereafter Davis, “Battle of Vella
Gulf”; more detail on the American torpedo development is covered by Robert Gannon, Hellions of the Deep: The
Development of American Torpedoes in World War II (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1996).
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ships, men, and supplies would doom military endeavors. The manner, therefore, in which the
Americans and Japanese committed their ships to battle, especially destroyers, is very important.
During the Solomon Islands campaign, the United States Navy achieved victory in the
night surface battles by being able to innovate in three key areas: (1) adaption of tactics and
strategy; (2) implementation of technology; and (3) use of resources. These three factors
influenced and relied upon each other so it is unrealistic to discuss them separately. The factors,
therefore, will be discussed as a whole through three chapters of surface battles that correspond
roughly with the phases of battle that made up the Solomon Islands campaign: Guadalcanal
(August 1942-February 1943), New Georgia (February 1943-October 1943, and Bougainville
(October 1943-December 1943). As one campaign was ending, the combatants were preparing
for the next campaign which resulted in the phases overlapping one another chronologically.
The dates listed, therefore, should be used as for general reference only and not as concrete
timeframes. Studying the actions of the destroyers in selected battles from the campaigns
illustrate the evolution of the three factors. As the following chapters show, the American
learning curve was not a steady course to success. It involved a series of advances and setbacks
that interacted with the Japanese learning curve as well. Both sides sought to learn from their
experiences and craft a plan for victory that could withstand the dynamics and chaos of modern
warfare. The Americans did not achieve victory because the Japanese sailors proved
incompetent at surface warfare. Instead, the excellent performance of the Imperial Fleet forced
the Americans to use all their available resources to achieve victory in the South Pacific seas.

17

CHAPTER 2
GUADALCANAL PHASE
In the early dawn hours of 22 August 1942, destroyers Blue and Henley searched the
waters off Guadalcanal for a Japanese landing force reported to be in the area. They cruised
back and forth across Iron Bottom Sound using their SC radar sets to penetrate the darkness of
moonless tropical night. Twice, the Blue detected a fast-moving object on the SC radar but it
quickly disappeared each time. Guns and torpedoes were trained on the object, but visibility was
poor so no visual confirmation of the target could be obtained. The captain, Commander Harold
N. Williams, assumed they had made contact with a friendly patrol craft.
Unknown to the Americans, the Japanese destroyer Kawakaze had been sent to the area
to hunt for American ships. The ship did not possess radar, but it had well trained lookouts with
superb night optical gear. When they spotted the American vessels, the captain, Commander
Wakabayashi Kazuo, ordered a torpedo attack. The ship launched six Type 93 torpedoes and
retired toward Savo Island. At 0359 local time, one of the torpedoes smashed into Blue wrecking
her stern, stopping the main engines and killing two sailors. Twenty-two more were wounded.
The torpedo damaged the ship so badly that the Americans could not tow the stricken ship to
Tulagi harbor, so they had to scuttle her the next day. Once again, Japanese deftness at night
attacks had added another ship to the depths of Iron Bottom Sound.20
Even though the action of 22 August was a minor skirmish, it illustrated the challenges
faced by the American Navy in the nighttime naval battles of the Solomons campaigns. Neither
side may have been fighting the war as foreseen in prewar plans, but the Japanese emphasis on
20

USS Blue, After Action Report, August 25, 1942, Box 854, Record Group (RG) 38, National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), College Park. Japanese perspective found in Frank, Guadalcanal, 162-166.
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attritional nocturnal combat suited the situation in the Solomons more than American naval
doctrine. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy punished the U.S. Navy severely in surface
actions. Examination of ship losses illustrates this fact. During the Guadalcanal phase of the
fighting, the Japanese lost 24 warships in the area while the Allies lost 25. These losses were
due to airplanes, mines, and submarines in addition to surface actions. If only the surface actions
are counted, the Allies lost 15 ships while the Japanese only lost 8.21
Originally, the Allies decided to attack Guadalcanal and Tulagi in order to counter
Japanese threats against the shipping lanes between the United States and Australia. The
Japanese had established a seaplane base at Tulagi and were constructing an airfield on the
Lunga plain of Guadalcanal. These bases projected Japanese power too far south to suit the
Americans, so Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Fleet, pushed for offensive action against them in order to seize the initiative and
maintain the momentum gained by victories at Coral Sea and Midway. Officially, the United
States had promised its allies that priority would be given to building up resources for an
offensive against Germany. Thus, any offensive in the Pacific would have to be implemented
with a scarcity of men and materiel.22
After the initial American landings, both sides raced to reinforce their troops on the
island. For six months, the two foes battled in the air, at sea, and on land. The Japanese
achieved the upper hand in the naval surface battles due to factors such as their intensive night
training in combat. Despite this advantage, they failed to supply enough troops, medicine, and
food to Guadalcanal. On land, they consistently underestimated American forces, so they
21

Statistics are found in Frank, Guadalcanal, 601-602.
Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Washington: Center for Military History,
1962), 305-323; Frank, Guadalcanal, 3-53.
22

19

squandered their men in suicidal attacks on a superior foe. In the air, the lack of nearby airfields
and poor tactics proved disastrous for Japanese aircrews. Despite setbacks at sea, the Americans
were more effective in getting additional troops and supplies to Guadalcanal. Due to all these
factors, the Japanese were forced to admit defeat and evacuated the island in February 1943.23
The Americans and Japanese fought five major surface engagements during this phase:
Savo Island, Cape Esperance, two nocturnal battles that comprised the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal, and Tassafaronga. Gradually, the Americans improved somewhat in their
performance, but they still lost the final battle off Tassafaronga. Nonetheless, the American
Navy acquired valuable combat experience. Each individual battle had its own cause and effect
but studying the roles of the destroyers highlights the themes of tactical adjustment, technology
implementation, and use of resources. For brevity’s sake, only the Savo Island, Cape Esperance,
and Tassafaronga battles are discussed as they amply illustrate these factors. In addition, not all
of the destroyers are discussed, but selected ones illustrate the overall experience and key themes
of the surface battles.
The Battle of Savo Island was briefly described in the Introduction. During that dark
night of 8-9 August 1942, the American Navy suffered one of the worst defeats in its history.24
The forces that fought the battle served under the overall command of Rear Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner who had responsibility for the entire amphibious force around the Guadalcanal
area. Under Turner, Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley of the Australian Navy commanded the
screen whose responsibility was to defend against surface attack. Various reasons given for the
23

Frank, Guadalcanal, 598-618; another good account of the Guadalcanal campaign can be found in
Stanley Coleman Jersey, Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University
Press, 2008).
24
General information about the battle found in Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Combat Narrative,
Solomon Islands Campaign II: The Battle of Savo Island (Washington, 1943), hereafter ONI Combat Narrative II;
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defeat include the failure of Allied air reconnaissance, misinterpretation of intelligence by Rear
Admiral Turner, dispersal of forces by Rear Admiral Crutchley, and the skill of the Japanese
force. In addition, the Allied ships’ crews had been operating with little sleep over the last few
days and were surprised by the arrival of Japanese ships in their midst.
A majority of the destroyers in the Allied force came from Destroyer Squadron 4 (Desron
4) consisting of Destroyer Divisions 7 and 8 (Desdiv 7 and Desdiv 8). During the war,
destroyers of the Pacific fleet were organized into destroyer squadrons that consisted of two or
more destroyer divisions. Four ships made up a division. Outside the divisions, a separate
destroyer served as flagship for the squadron. This type of organization served mainly as an
administration function. Although squadrons could serve as battle units, they were often
separated pursuing different tasks. Operationally, the navy organized into task forces made up of
subordinate task groups and task units. Ship assignment to these forces could change frequently.
The demands of war necessitated separation of squadrons among different task forces and
groups, but the situation prevented a group of ships from training extensively together as a unit.
Five of the six destroyers that participated in the battle came from Desron 4 and its
component divisions: Desdiv 7 and Desdiv 8 (Patterson, Blue, Ralph Talbot, Bagley, and Helm).
Wilson, from Destroyer Division 15, replaced the Desron 4 ship Jarvis which had been badly
damaged by an earlier Japanese air raid. The other vessels of Desron 4, including flagship
Selfridge, guarded the transports anchored around Tulagi and Guadalcanal.25 The replacement of
Jarvis by Wilson instead of another ship from Desron 4 illustrated the Navy’s lack of ability
about keeping squadrons and divisions operating together.
25
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Per Crutchley’s orders, Blue and Ralph Talbot assumed their picket positions to the west
of Savo an hour before sundown. The Allied ships assigned to the Northern and Southern groups
assumed their positions to the northeast and southeast of Savo respectively as night fell on the
southern Solomons. In case of attack, the Northern and Southern cruiser-destroyer groups would
mutually support each other. If ordered, the destroyers of Desron 4 would form a striking force
five miles to the northwest of Savo.26 Crutchley and his flagship Australia was supposed to be in
the Southern group, but Turner ordered him to attend a conference aboard the Task Force
flagship McCawley near the Guadalcanal anchorage. Crutchley steamed away to the conference
in Australia and left Captain Howard Bode of Chicago in command.
As Mikawa’s force passed Savo and entered Iron Bottom Sound, the picket destroyers
Blue and Ralph Talbot remained unaware of its presence. Earlier at 2345, Ralph Talbot detected
Japanese cruiser float planes dispatched by Mikawa to drop flares over the Allied ships. The
destroyers, however, could not identify the planes as enemy or friendly. Ralph Talbot radioed a
warning to the commander of Desron 4 and the Task Force Commander but could not get the
message through. Some ships did not possess the relatively new Talk Between Ships (TBS)
shortwave radio that the Ralph Talbot used, so they did not get the warning. The commander of
Desdiv 8, Commander Frank Walker in Patterson, received the message and passed it on to the
Task Force Commander who finally received the message a little after midnight. No one
connected the plane to an approaching enemy force.27

26

Victor Crutchley, “Special Instructions to Screening Group and Vessels temporarily assigned”, August
1942, Box 71, RG 38, NARA.
27
USS Ralph Talbot, After Action Report, September 1, 1942, Box 60, RG 313, NARA, hereafter AA Report,
USS Ralph Talbot, September 1, 1942; USS Ralph Talbot, After Action Report, August 11, 1942, Box 71, RG 38,
NARA, College Park, hereafter AA Report, USS Ralph Talbot, August 11, 1942; Frank, Guadalcanal, 104-105.

22

The SC radar that Blue and Ralph Talbot carried was an early version of search radar, but
neither it nor human eyes detected the Japanese force. The Japanese sailors, however, spotted
Blue and trained their guns on her but, blissfully unaware of being a target for the entire Japanese
task force, she continued on her patrol vector away from the enemy ships. Relieved at not being
detected, Mikawa ordered his forces forward and prepared to attack any American ships that he
encountered. Blue spotted flashes around 0145, but detected no enemy ships and took no part in
the ensuing battle. The only vessels that she saw was the Jarvis leaving the area after being
damaged by bombs earlier in the day and a two-masted inter-island schooner.28
As Japanese cruiser Chokai led the force around the southern side of Savo Island, they
spotted the Allied ships of the southern group in the darkness. Mikawa gave the order for
torpedoes to be launched and they shot into the water toward the unsuspecting Allied vessels.
While screening for the southern group of cruisers, Patterson first spotted the Japanese vessels at
0146. She radioed a warning to the rest of the fleet, but the Japanese had already attained their
surprise. As the Patterson swung left so she could launch torpedoes, the sailors on board her
spotted wakes from the Long Lances streaming by the ship. Fortunately for Patterson, none hit
her. Commander Frank Walker, captain of the Patterson and commander of Desdiv 8, ordered
the guns to open fire as the ship wheeled to the east and fought a running battle with the Japanese
light cruisers Tenryu, Furutaka, and Yubari. The ship terminated action at 0200 when the enemy
fleet steamed out of view toward the northeast.29 In the meantime, the Japanese ships had
pummeled Patterson and the other ships of the southern group mercilessly with guns and
torpedoes. The destroyer had its number three gun disabled and a brief fire enflamed the aft
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portions of the ship. However, Patterson could still fight and maneuver. As for the heavier
ships, a torpedo damaged the American cruiser Chicago and shells perforated the Australian
cruiser Canberra causing it to list heavily. Patterson quickly steamed to the sinking ship’s aid
but the Canberra eventually slid under the waves.
Bagley had sighted the Japanese ships immediately after Patterson. The ship launched
four torpedoes but did not confirm any of them hitting targets. Losing contact with the Japanese
force, the destroyer started toward a rendezvous ordered by Admiral Crutchley. After his
conference with Turner, the Australian admiral had decided to remain near the transports for the
night. Once firing began, Crutchley had Australia steam to a position that placed it between the
hostile forces and the transports and ordered the destroyers to congregate around him. Some
ships became confused and went to the original rendezvous point specified in the admiral’s
orders. Others got lost in the darkness and mists and could not link up with the Australia. As for
Bagley, she passed by a burning ship that turned out to be the Astoria of the Northern Group.
The destroyer went to the sinking ship’s aid and saw no combat for the rest of the night.30
Mikawa’s force became separated during the first fight and steamed toward the Allied
Northern group in two columns. They engaged the American ships in a murderous crossfire that
eventually sank all three of the cruisers (Astoria, Vincennes, and Quincy). Destroyers Helm and
Wilson were screening the northern force when they observed gunfire to the south about 0145.
The column kept steaming ahead, but they had no knowledge of the Southern group’s plan of
action, nor whom exactly they were engaging in battle. Suddenly, the Japanese force illuminated
the American vessels and opened fire. As the Japanese started firing on the Northern group, the
Helm opened fire but immediately stopped because she could not discern targets. Ordered to
30
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attack by the group commander in Vincennes, the destroyer headed to the south and confronted
an unknown ship that turned out to be an American destroyer. The commander of Desdiv 7
ordered the destroyer to proceed to the rendezvous point as originally stated in Crutchley’s
orders. The ship’s captain, Lieutenant Commander Chester Carroll, did not receive the message
from Crutchley ordering him to a new meeting place, so the destroyer failed to meet up with the
Australia. Helm saw no more combat that night and went to assist survivors from the sinking
ships the next morning.31
Wilson received the Patterson’s warning and observed the gunfire to the south. Readying
for action, the ship was still surprised when Mikawa’s force opened fire. The destroyer engaged
various targets with its main batteries, narrowly avoiding a collision with another vessel that it
identified as an American destroyer. After the action, the ship steamed toward Savo Island until
she received reports of a Japanese cruiser in the same area. Spotting no cruiser, the Wilson
feared she had been wrongly identified as an enemy vessel and left the area to avoid being fired
upon by friendly ships. Like Helm, the Wilson conducted rescue operations the following
morning.32
The final shots of the battle were fired by picket destroyer Ralph Talbot. The Japanese
force sailed around Savo Island straight past the small Ralph Talbot. The destroyer’s radar failed
to detect the enemy ships a second time. At 0217, the American ship was illuminated and fired
upon. Thinking that the ship was being fired upon by friendly vessels, the Ralph Talbot flashed
recognition lights until it identified the attacking ship as a Japanese cruiser. Commander Joseph
Callahan, ship’s captain, ordered guns and torpedoes fired and the destroyer gamely fought the
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Japanese task force by itself. Several shots smashed into the destroyer causing it to list to
starboard and setting it afire. Fortunately for the Ralph Talbot, Mikawa decided to end the action
and return to bases at Rabaul and Kavieng. The Japanese hurriedly steamed by and action
terminated by 0230. The American destroyer implemented effective damage control techniques
and managed to limp back to its base for repairs.33
Thus, in under an hour the Japanese had sunk four cruisers, damaged a fifth, and scored
hits on two destroyers. In return, Chokai and its sister ships had only received relatively slight
damage from American gunfire. No torpedoes fired by the American destroyers hit their targets.
According to post-battle analysis, division of forces, bad communications, ineffective use of
radar, confused command structures, and lack of training in night combat all played a part in the
American defeat.34 Unbeknownst to the Americans at this time, they also possessed faulty
torpedoes and did not realize the extreme range of the Japanese Type 93. Some of the torpedo
hits suffered by the Allied ships were attributed to submarines because the Americans refused to
believe that surface ships could score hits at long ranges with torpedoes.35 As news of the
disaster spread across the Allied high commands, officers studied the battle in order to learn
lessons that would help in future engagements. They had a chance to use the lessons with the
next major surface battle, Cape Esperance.
After several weeks of clashes on land, at sea, and in the air, both the Japanese and the
Americans realized that Guadalcanal was crucial to the course of the Pacific war. Both sides
reinforced their garrisons on the island. The Americans usually operated by day while the
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Japanese made their runs at night. In addition to reinforcements, the Japanese frequently
bombarded Henderson Field, the American air base on Guadalcanal. As this caused disruption in
both air and ground operations, the Americans realized that they needed to counter the Japanese
night operations.
Trying to learn from the debacle at Savo, the Americans formed a cruiser-destroyer force,
Task Force 64, under the command of Rear Admiral Norman Scott. Originally, the force
consisted of two heavy cruisers (Salt Lake City and San Francisco), one light cruiser (Boise), and
three destroyers from Desron 12 (Farenholt, Laffey, and Buchanan). Captain Robert G. Tobin
commanded the destroyers from flagship Farenholt. Later, the light cruiser Helena and
destroyers Duncan and McCalla, both from Desron 12 as well, reinforced the task force. These
were the ships that fought at Cape Esperance.36
Scott formed a battle plan where the ships operated in a column led and trailed by
destroyers with cruisers in the middle. They conducted night firing exercises and formulated a
night fighting doctrine. According to this doctrine, the van destroyers would illuminate targets
upon contact and fire torpedoes. After the torpedoes were in the water, both destroyers and
cruisers would engage the enemy with gunfire. The last two cruisers in the column and the
trailing destroyers would keep a watch on the disengaged side for other enemy forces. If ships
became disabled, they were supposed to fall out on the disengaged side to avoid being hit by
friendly fire. Scott stressed the importance of maintaining formation to facilitate identification
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between American and Japanese ships.37 By the plan, Scott hoped to avoid the communication
problems, dispersal of forces, misidentifications, and other problems encountered at Savo Island.
In early October, Task Force 64 helped cover a convoy of Army troops reinforcing
Guadalcanal. They lingered for a couple of days outside of enemy air range near Rennell Island,
located to the south of Guadalcanal, waiting for word of enemy ships approaching Ironbottom
Sound. Finally, on October 11, 1942, American aircraft reported two cruisers and six destroyers
steaming toward Guadalcanal. Scott ordered his force forward to intercept the Japanese ships.
However, he remained unaware that two different Japanese forces were approaching.
The Japanese had decided to reinforce their island garrison again so they dispatched a
Reinforcement Group consisting of the seaplane carriers Chitose and Nisshin escorted by six
destroyers, all carrying troops and supplies. The American planes spotted this force but they did
not detect another Japanese force sent to bombard Henderson Field.38 This force, led by Rear
Admiral Goto Aritomo consisted of three cruisers and two destroyers. The Reinforcement Group
arrived that night off Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal and started unloading men and supplies.
They would play no part in the upcoming battle.
While they worked, Scott sailed up the west coast of Guadalcanal. The heavy cruiser San
Francisco served as his flagship, but it used the old SC radar set that had not operated very
reliably in past battles. Several ships now had the newer SG radar that possessed improved
detection characteristics and better optical scopes. The ships with SG radar detected Goto’s
force approaching from the west although they could not yet identify them. Maintaining radio
silence, they did not inform the flagship. Scott felt he was steaming too far north so he reversed
37
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his column. By performing this maneuver, he inadvertently performed the classic naval tactical
maneuver of “crossing the T” by placing his column ninety degrees relative to the approaching
enemy column. In this position, he could use full broadsides against the force while they could
only use their frontal batteries. The American column opened fire and pummeled the Japanese
force despite communication misunderstandings over the bearing and identification of the enemy
ships. As the ships began to radio information about the enemy contacts they failed to designate
whether the reported bearings were true or relative to the column’s position. Also, one ship used
the designation “bogies” which usually meant aircraft instead of ships. 39
Goto believed that American ships had cleared the Guadalcanal area so his ships were not
alert as they should have been. Thus, they were caught by surprise as salvos started landing
amongst their ships. By the time the action ended at 0020 on the morning of 12 October, Task
Force 64 had sunk one cruiser and one destroyer and had damaged the other three ships of
Goto’s command. Goto himself received mortal wounds from American shells. Allied aircraft
would draw more blood the following morning. As for Scott, he lost the Duncan, and received
damage on the Farenholt, Boise, and Salt Lake City.
Scott’s pre-action course change caused considerable disarray in the van destroyers. The
rear admiral ordered a column movement, but his own flagship misunderstood him and made an
immediate turn. The other ships followed the flagship, but the van destroyers were left behind.
Farenholt and Laffey raced to reassume the van position while Duncan, detecting Goto’s force,
launched a torpedo attack on the Japanese ships. According to Lieutenant Commander Edmund
39
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Taylor, captain of the Duncan, he thought the Farenholt was starting to attack the approaching
enemy vessels. Thus, he followed suit and the destroyer wound up charging the Japanese battle
line by itself. Duncan engaged the cruisers with guns and torpedoes. As it maneuvered, the ship
placed herself between the two opposing lines of ships. Shells started hitting the Duncan, killing
sailors and starting fires. The ship flashed recognition lights to the American column, but some
of the shells hitting the destroyer may have been from friendly vessels. The sailors tried to
extinguish the fires and save the ship, but it had received too much damage and finally sank.40
Farenholt, as the destroyer squadron flagship, assumed the van position when ordered
into column formation at 2223. Lacking search radar, she used the FC fire control radar to scan
for enemy vessels. Possessing a much narrower beam than standard search radars, the FC radar
was not as effective when examining large swaths of ocean. After Scott’s shift in column
direction at 2332, the destroyer found herself out of the van along with Duncan and Laffey. She
moved to reassume the lead position, but the action started before she could accomplish that task.
Shells from the American cruisers sailed over the destroyer but fortunately did not hit her.
Admiral Scott momentarily ordered a cease fire to ascertain if the destroyers were indeed being
hit by friendly fire. Captain Tobin, onboard Farenholt, reassured the Admiral so he ordered the
firing renewed, although some ships had continued to pepper the Japanese with shots. Farenholt
combated Goto’s force using her main batteries, but she occupied a very exposed position. At
2348, shells began to hit the ship flooding the firerooms and causing a 30-degree list. By 0005
on 12 October, Farenholt had to withdraw from the fight. She stayed afloat and made it back to
the base at Espiritu Santo for repairs.41
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The Americans achieved a victory at Cape Esperance although fortune played a bigger
part than tactical skill. Americans only “capped the T” by chance and the Japanese lacked their
normal alertness at night. Nonetheless, the American captains handled their ships well and
American gunnery was fast and relatively accurate. The column formation had performed well
even though it did not eliminate the confusion of maneuvering and fighting by night as the
experiences of the Farenholt and Duncan attest. Some naval officers proposed that destroyers be
separated and used as a distinct force apart from the cruisers. The difficulty of differentiating
friend from foe at night, however, precluded the implementation of this plan at the time.42 The
ships with the new SG radar sets noticed improved search and targeting characteristics, but
officers still did not appreciate the full usefulness of the technology in command and control as
exemplified by Scott’s choice of a flagship without the SG. Despite these difficulties, they were
learning. Post-battle analysis recommended that flagships have the SG radar and also a tactical
plot be established to correlate the TBS communiqués, radar contacts, and sight reports.43 This
concept would evolve into the combat information center discussed in the next chapter.
Tassafaronga became the final surface action of the Guadalcanal phase. Despite the
experience attained in four previous night surface battles, an American cruiser-destroyer group
sustained a humiliating defeat at the hands of a smaller Japan force that consisted solely of
destroyers. Worse, most of the destroyers had supplies on their decks that inhibited their ability
to fight and maneuver. The Japanese were trying to get supplies to their starving troops on
Guadalcanal, so they devised a plan where destroyers hauled drums of food to the island. The
ships would steam in at night and drop the drums in the water near the coast and let tides carry
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them ashore to be recovered by the ground troops. Unfortunately for the Japanese, American
aircraft and torpedo boats would often use the drums as target practice the next morning.44
In late November, Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo led a force of eight destroyers in a supply
mission to Guadalcanal where they planned to drop food barrels off Tassafaronga Point. Six
destroyers carried barrels on their decks while two others screened the group. The Americans
received word that the Japanese would try a reinforcement run so Admiral William F. Halsey,
Jr., now Commander South Pacific, ordered it to be intercepted. Earlier in the month, Halsey
had ordered Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid to form Task Force 67 which was another cruiserdestroyer force intended to replace the ones shattered at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
Kincaid devised an operational plan for his force but was replaced by Rear Admiral Carleton
Wright two days before the battle. Wright adopted Kincaid’s plan and reviewed it with the ships
under his command that included four heavy cruisers (Minneapolis, New Orleans, Northampton,
and Pensacola), one light cruiser (Honolulu), and four destroyers from assorted divisions
(Fletcher, Drayton, Maury, and Cole). Commander William Cole of Fletcher, the senior
destroyer captain, commanded the destroyer force. Another flag officer, Rear Admiral Mahlon
Tisdale in Honolulu, commanded that ship along with Northampton. According to the plan, the
four destroyers would lead the force followed by the cruisers. After radar contact, a night action
would start by the destroyers firing torpedoes, followed by all ships engaging the enemy with
gunfire. Starshells instead of searchlights would be used to illuminate because searchlights drew
enemy fire.45
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Wright led his forces into Iron Bottom Sound from the east via Lengo Channel on the
night of 30 November 1942. As they entered the Guadalcanal area, Task Force 67 passed an
American transport group heading back to Allied bases in the rear. Per Halsey’s orders, two
ships from Desdiv 9 (Lamson and Lardner) left the transport group and joined Wright’s force to
provide reinforcement. They had no knowledge of the operational plan and Wright lacked the
time to properly brief them. Therefore, he placed the two destroyers in the rear of the column.46
Meanwhile, Tanaka had arrived from the west and was unloading supplies near
Tassafaronga. Takanami screened the force from the front while two destroyers started
unloading under the watchful eye of Tanaka in Naganami. The four remaining destroyers under
Captain Sato Torajiro steamed along the coast to a second drop point. This was the Japanese
configuration when Allied radar detected them shortly after 2300. Around the same time, sharpeyed Japanese lookouts aboard Takanami warned Tanaka that Allied ships were approaching.
He ordered ships to desist from supply operations and prepare to attack enemy ships.
The Americans initiated the action first with torpedoes followed by gunfire. Their SG
radar helped them find targets but they unfortunately concentrated all their fire on the ship
nearest to them which was Takanami. The unfortunate Japanese destroyer suffered many shell
hits and became a flaming wreck. Sato’s group blended in with the coast and remained
undetected. Swinging around behind the American force, they launched a devastating torpedo
attack. Tanaka’s group fired Long Lances as well. All these torpedoes wrecked the American
cruisers. Northampton sank and Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Pensacola suffered extreme
damage. Only Honolulu remained undamaged and Admiral Tisdale led it in a sweep around

46

67.

Task Force 67, After Action Report, December 9, 1942, Box 241, RG 38, NARA, hereafter AA Report, TF

33

Savo Island. Barely afloat, the other three cruisers had to make repairs in the Guadalcanal area
before being able to return to bases further south. All three cruisers would be out of action for
over a year.47 Tanaka’s force retired from the area having lost only one destroyer. A simple
supply mission had turned into a resounding victory for the Japanese.
The two destroyers of Desdiv 9 had trouble spotting targets and possessed little
knowledge of the operational plan. Thus, they participated very little in the action. Fletcher’s
actions illustrate the general experiences of the van destroyers. According to Commander Cole’s
report, the destroyer made radar contact at 2310. By 2316, the ship had calculated a firing
solution for its torpedoes with a range of 7,000 yards and requested permission to launch.
Admiral Wright denied permission due to concerns over the range being too great. According to
Fletcher’s executive officer, Joseph Wylie, it was foolish for a destroyer to waste time by
requesting permission to fire if a destroyer had a good solution. Cole did not receive
authorization until 2321 by which time the good firing solution had changed to a poor one. Ten
torpedoes hit the water, but no hits could be confirmed. Fletcher and the other destroyers fired
their main batteries until they passed by the Japanese ships and away from the action. As the
ship maneuvered around Savo Island to get back into combat position, the cruisers got hammered
by the torpedoes.
According to Wylie, Wright censured Commander Cole for firing the torpedoes with a
poor solution and not supporting the cruisers more effectively. Cole got relieved of command,
but subsequent investigations vindicated his actions and he went on to command a destroyer
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squadron during the Philippines campaign.48 In the words of one prominent historian, “it seems
clear that Wright’s hesitation spoiled the torpedo attack and Cole’s maneuvers precisely
paralleled those of Admiral Tisdale in Honolulu, who escaped criticism.”49 At the time, however,
Cole’s superiors criticized his actions. In his report, Wright indicated that the torpedo solution
used by Cole was bad and complemented the destroyers that did not fire their torpedoes. A
report by Nimitz also criticized the destroyers for not closing within 4,000 yards before firing
torpedoes. The 7,000 range, however, was well within the operational ranges of the Mark XV
torpedo. Such a situation displays the accusations and finger-pointing associated with a
devastating loss.50
Cole did not lead the cruisers into a devastating torpedo attack, nor did he cause many of
the problems that resulted in the severe defeat suffered by the American Navy that night.
Americans still lacked an appreciation for the Long Lance. Wright and Nimitz believed that
submarines or an alternate force of cruisers and destroyers in the area fired some of the torpedoes
that hit the cruisers. They had trouble believing that the Long Lances could have all originated
with Tanaka’s force, and they refused to believe reports from captured Japanese that lookouts
spotted American ships in the dark night. Instead, they believed that the Japanese intercepted
TBS transmissions that warned them of the American’s presence. Such ignorance of Japanese
capabilities would continue into future campaigns. The battle also generated discussions about
keeping destroyers tethered to the cruiser column as well as the use of heavy cruisers in such
restricted waters. In addition, American commanders began to realize that the constant shifting
48
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of ships and commanders between groups not only affected training but inhibited team cohesion
in battles. A force that trained together for night actions would be far more effective. 51
The brief descriptions of these three battles (Savo Island, Cape Esperance, and
Tassafaronga) provide examples of how destroyers conducted surface combat actions. In
addition, they illustrate the three key factors discussed earlier: tactical evolution, use of
resources, and adaption of technology. As mentioned in the Introduction, prewar American
naval tactics centered upon fighting a Mahan style battle in the open ocean with battleships as the
key element. Carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines all had their role but as supporters
and protectors of the battle line.52 The situation in the restricted waters of the Solomons
necessitated a change in tactical thought. Battleships were not ideally suited for use in such an
area because they lacked room to maneuver and became susceptible to attacks by lighter craft.
The only night surface battle in which they fought during this time was the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal and Halsey only dispatched them to the area because he had nothing else to send.53
Thus, the lighter vessels assumed preeminent roles in such combat. Over the course of the
battles, all thirteen heavy cruisers dispatched to the area had either been sunk or damaged. Naval
leaders noticed that light cruisers and destroyers fared better in the night battles than heavier
ships. As the action moved into the New Georgia area, the resultant task forces would display
this lesson.54 Destroyers, especially, would play a bigger role.
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The battles around Guadalcanal demonstrated the evolution of Allied tactics. At Savo
Island, Crutchley’s disposition of his forces looked good on paper. All avenues of attack
appeared to be covered, but the dispersal of forces led to defeat, confusion, and lack of support
among the groups. Night battles turned into fast and furious melees that only lasted for a short
time period. There were no long periods of scouting, maneuvering, and fighting as in Mahan
style battles. Thus, a force had to be well trained, familiar with the characteristics of the other
ships in the formation, and in possession of a good plan. After Savo Island, the American navy
thought the solution was to keep their forces concentrated in a single column of ships. This
tactic apparently worked well at Cape Esperance but ended in disaster at Tassafaronga.
Obviously other factors such as training needed to be considered.
Prewar tactical instructions stressed that night combat should be avoided by the battle
line with only destroyers making nocturnal torpedo attacks to disrupt an enemy fleet. As a result,
training in night combat was neglected by the navy prior to the war. According to one officer,
his ship never trained in night tactics prior to the war. 55 Thus, the Japanese had the upper hand
in training. As the war progressed, more night training was conducted by the navy but the
constant shuffling of ships between task forces and combat losses hampered efforts to build a
well-trained night fighting force.
The use of resources emerges as a second key factor. Nimitz and his commanders began
to realize that keeping ships together as a unit made them more effective in battle, especially the
destroyer divisions and squadrons. The ships available to naval commanders in the South
Pacific, however, were limited and the number of missions numerous. Convoys had to be
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escorted, carriers screened, and patrols conducted. Ships also had to go stateside to repair battle
damage or to have normal maintenance conducted. Often, commanders had to grab the first ship
available for a particular mission. Thus, no set group of ships operated together for very long.
As will be seen, these lessons in tactics and resources were carried by the Navy into the New
Georgia campaign with mixed results.
As for adaption and use of technology, radar, communications, and torpedoes became the
critical factors. During this phase, American naval officers recognized the importance of radar,
particularly the newer SG models. Radar aided ships not only in battle but in other areas such as
navigation. Radar benefited the Americans in many ways; however, they did not always use it
effectively. American forces had a tendency to concentrate their fire on the largest blips and
neglect the other ships displayed on their radar. In order to be more effective, they needed to
learn to disperse their fire among targets. This problem would plague the Americans throughout
the Solomons campaigns. As combat shifted to the New Georgia area, radar occupied center
stage so a more detailed discussion about this topic is found in Chapter 3. Communications such
as TBS were relatively new. As demonstrated at Savo, lack of effective communications
between ships could cripple a force’s fighting ability. As TBS became common, ships had to use
standard terminology and remember to clarify expressions such as relative versus true bearing.
Torpedoes bedeviled the Americans during this phase. As a general rule, American guns
and gunnery techniques operated well although they realized that they needed flashless powder
as opposed to smokeless powder during night fights. American torpedoes, however, failed
miserably. They often ran too deep and passed beneath their targets and the magnetic contact
exploders failed to work. Torpedo tests conducted by destroyers during the early days of the war
failed to reveal the problems with the depth running mechanisms and magnetic contact
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exploders. According to Russell Crenshaw, an officer on board USS Maury, they used dummy
warheads and the torpedo was intentionally set to run under the practice target so it could be
recovered afterward. Therefore, it was impossible for the tests to detect problems with contact
exploders and depth mechanisms. A random survey of test reports early in the war failed to find
any of them documenting problems with the depth runs or exploders. Combat performance,
however, convinced many sailors that the torpedoes had big problems. Joseph Wylie, executive
officer on Fletcher, reported that they disabled their magnetic exploders and used contact
exploders during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942. They also set the
torpedoes to run at the shallowest setting. By 1943, memos circulated reminding officers to
disable the magnetic contact exploders and to adjust depth settings.56
Unfortunately for the Americans, they were slower in grasping the capabilities of the
Japanese Type 93. After Tassafaronga, they respected the Japanese torpedo but still did not
recognize its incredible range as evidenced in reports blaming submarines for American losses.
The torpedo had been developed some years before the war so why had American intelligence
not realized the lethal potential of the weapon? According to Arthur McCollum, head of the
Office of Naval Intelligence Far East Desk prior to the war, it was hard to obtain reliable
information on Japanese weapons not only due to their secrecy but because many people
dismissed the capabilities of Japanese designers because they deemed them racially inferior.
Thus, any report that they had developed something superior to the Americans was met with
scorn. Any technical information that Intelligence gathered had to be sent to one of the Navy’s
technical bureau. In the case of the Type 93, Naval Intelligence reported to the Bureau of
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Ordnance prior to the war that the Japanese had developed a 24-inch torpedo with a 1000kg
warhead that had a range of 10,000 yards at 45 knots. The Japanese torpedo actually had a test
range of 22,000 yards. The Bureau of Ordnance did not like outsiders intruding upon its affairs,
they favored the gun over the torpedo, and they had a bureaucracy that impeded efficient reaction
to reports such as Long Lance. For all these reasons, they refused to believe that the Japanese
could develop a better torpedo than the Americans and forced Intelligence to rescind the report.
Only during the war would American naval officers and sailors realize what the Long Lance
could do to a fleet caught unaware. This legacy carried into the New Georgia phase.57
The American Navy learned much during the Guadalcanal phase that would help it
during the coming battles in the Central Solomons. However, it still faced several setbacks
before it finally developed a winning formula for these night battles. As the Americans inched
slowly up the Solomon Ladder, the role of the destroyers continued to grow.
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CHAPTER 3
NEW GEORGIA PHASE
During the early evening of 5 March 1943, Japanese destroyers Minegumo and
Murasame set out from Shortland Island to resupply their airbase on Kolombangara Island. The
base had been built on the southeastern tip of the island at Vila which gave the Japanese two
options in accessing the area. They could steam through the narrow Blackett Strait to the south,
or they could use the broad Kula Gulf to the east that separated Kolombangara from the nearby
island of New Georgia (reference Map in Appendix). Captain Tachibana Masao chose to lead
the two vessels through Blackett Strait. He anchored off Vila and started unloading supplies. By
midnight, they had finished unloading operations and prepared to return to their base at
Shortland. Tachibana opted to return via Kula Gulf because it would be easier to navigate in the
moonless night than Blackett Strait. This decision would cost the Imperial Navy two
destroyers.58
As Tachibana’s force headed north, an American task force under Rear Admiral Aaron
Merrill comprised of three light cruisers and three destroyers rounded the tip of New Georgia
and entered Kula Gulf. Admiral Halsey had dispatched the ships to bombard the Vila airfield
while a smaller force of four destroyers bombarded Munda airfield on New Georgia. As
Merrill’s force steamed through Kula Gulf, a radar-equipped PBY patrol plane known as a Black
Cat scouted ahead of his vessels. A radio message from Guadalcanal had warned Merrill that
two Japanese light cruisers had been spotted heading towards New Georgia. The admiral
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decided to proceed with the bombardment while remaining alert to the presence of any Japanese
ships in the area.
As his ships navigated their way to Vila, radar plot detected a blip that it interpreted as
being Sasamboki Island. However, the “island” started moving and separated into two distinct
blips. Aware that he had detected enemy ships, Merrill closed his force to within 10,000 yards
and opened fire. Tachibana’s force steamed in column with Murasame leading Minegumo.
Aiming at the largest blip on the radar screen, the American force concentrated fire on the
Minegumo until it stopped moving and became a floating funeral pyre. A torpedo from Waller
added the coup de grace a few minutes later and she sank by 0115. Murasame tried to return
fire, but quickly became inundated with six-inch and five-inch shell fire. Outgunned, she slid
under the waves by 0130.59 The United States fleet had won another night surface action.
After securing a foothold in the southern Solomons with the victory at Guadalcanal, the
Americans sought to neutralize the Japanese base at Rabaul and penetrate the enemy perimeter of
island strongholds in the Pacific. Their next move would be an assault on New Georgia and
other islands of the Central Solomons as part of an overall South Pacific strategy that also
involved campaigns in New Guinea. The first half of 1943 saw the Americans bombarding
Japanese bases around New Georgia combined with air raids and naval mining operations. In
late June 1943, an American force invaded the New Georgia Island group sparking another
violently fought campaign. Despite tactical problems with their ground forces, the Americans
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eventually achieved victory by the end of October after another arduous land-sea-air contest that
included several night surface actions. Once again, the Americans suffered heavy losses in these
battles, but they showed overall improvement and had crafted a winning combination of strategy,
technology, and resource use that would serve them well in future campaigns in the Northern
Solomons.60
As the Allied and Japanese forces shifted their attention to the Central Solomons, the
American Navy sought to apply lessons learned during the bloody months around Guadalcanal.
Unlike August 1942, the American Navy now boldly steamed into enemy areas on night
missions. They were making more effective use of radar not only on board their ships but in
planes such as the Black Cats. As before, destroyers played a major role in the campaign and
even fought some actions without the heavier cruisers. Newer ships such as the Fletcher-class
destroyers now arrived in the area in significant numbers boosting American combat capability.
Commanders still had to shuttle ships back and forth among a multitude of tasks, but the naval
forces fighting in these battles maintained more unit coherence than before. This allowed them
to train together and become familiar with items such as operational plans and communications
procedures that forged a more effective force. However, the Japanese Navy still fought
aggressively and with skill. They would inflict defeats upon the Americans despite American
advantages in radar and new ships.
Six major surface actions occurred during this phase: the action with the Murasame and
Minegumo; Kula Gulf; Kolombangara; Vella Gulf, a destroyer action off Horaniu (a station on
Vella Lavella); and Vella Lavella. Overall, destroyers would play a larger role than in previous
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battles. The emergence of this enhanced role partially resulted from cruiser losses that often left
destroyers as the only available ships; however, American commanders were also beginning to
realize the true potential of the destroyer and their torpedoes in these night actions. Americans
finally began to deal with their torpedo problems and destroyers would increasingly use them
with skill, but they still underestimated Japanese torpedoes and suffered the consequences. A
small victory at Kula Gulf in early July was followed by a devastating defeat at Kolombangara a
week later where Japanese torpedoes smashed an American cruiser line. In early August, the
American Navy performed admirably at Vella Gulf and won an overwhelming victory against
the Japanese forces. Significantly, only destroyers participated in the battle. However, the
winning formula constructed at Vella Gulf did not prove to be a cure all for American naval
doctrine. It had to be applied wisely and in the right situation. The action off Horaniu later in
the month proved indecisive and the Americans suffered a slight defeat off Vella Lavella in
October. Nonetheless, the American Navy now had a viable doctrine that could be used to great
effect in the hands of a well-trained force and skilled commander.
In order to illustrate the key factors of tactical evolution, resource use, and technology
implementation, the experiences of the destroyers at Vella Gulf and Vella Lavella are discussed
in detail. The Battle of Vella Gulf in early August 1943 signified a key turning point in the
naval night battles. 61 An American task group of six destroyers sank an entire Japanese force
consisting of four destroyers without suffering any major damage to their own ships. They
accomplished this feat not through the use of gunfire, the key weapon in the eyes of many
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American naval tacticians, but by using torpedoes. At Vella Gulf, American sailors overcame
deficiencies in torpedoes and took advantage of their superiority in radar to inflict a crushing
defeat on the Japanese destroyers. This victory boosted American morale and demonstrated that
the Japanese Navy was not infallible on the nocturnal seas.
The destroyers that fought at Vella Gulf came from a striking force stationed at Tulagi.
In early 1943, American commanders decided to station a destroyer striking force at Tulagi to
provide local commanders with a core group of destroyers for use in various missions around
Guadalcanal and New Georgia. Instead of having to steam from bases located at Espiritu Santo,
Efate, and New Caledonia, these vessels could now operate from a base located in close
proximity to the combat zone. The force was a fluid organization consisting of five to eight
destroyers that routinely rotated in and out of the station. 62 Command of the force also changed
frequently because the duty was assumed by the senior destroyer officer present in the area
instead of by a permanent commander. The group conducted bombardment, mining, and
resupply missions around New Georgia in addition to reinforcing cruiser-destroyer task groups
sent to combat the enemy navy.
In July 1943, Commander Arleigh Burke assumed command of the group, now
designated Task Group 31.2, when part of his Desdiv 44 was posted to the area. Burke
developed a battle plan for his destroyers if they encountered enemy surface forces around New
Georgia while conducting their various missions of bombardment and resupply. Since arriving
in the South Pacific in early 1943, Burke had been studying the results of battles and training
exercises trying to craft an effective destroyer doctrine to use in the nocturnal surface battles.63
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He got a chance to test his doctrine in the later battles of Empress Augusta Bay and Cape St.
George fought during the Bougainville campaign in November 1943.64 For the time being,
however, Burke had to leave the combat area for another assignment before he got a chance to
implement his plan. The responsibility of leading Task Group 31.2 now fell to Commander
Frederick Moosbrugger.
On 3 August 1943, Moosbrugger, commander of Desdiv 12 and senior destroyer officer
present, took command of Task Group 31.2, which at that moment consisted of six destroyers
divided into two sections. Moosbrugger’s Desdiv 12 flagship, Dunlap, and two destroyers from
Desdiv 11, Craven and Maury, made up the first section designated as Division A-1.
Commander Rodger Simpson, commander of Desdiv 15, led the second section that was
designated Division A-2 and included Lang, Sterett, and Stack, all from Desdiv 15. 65
On 5 August 1943, Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, Halsey’s amphibious forces
commander, ordered Moosbrugger to take Task Group 31.2 and conduct a sweep of Vella Gulf.
Intelligence reports indicated that Japanese ships would steam through Vella Gulf to
Kolombangara with troops for the Munda battlefield. Vella Gulf lay on the opposite side of
Kolombangara from the well-traveled Kula Gulf. American vessels had patrolled Kula Gulf
many times but had rarely ventured into Vella Gulf. The islands of Vella Lavella, Gizo, and
Kolombangara framed Vella Gulf on three sides with the fourth side open to the waters of New
Georgia Sound. In addition to New Georgia Sound, ships could enter the gulf via Gizo Strait
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between Gizo and Vella Lavella or Blackett Strait between Gizo and Kolombangara. Blackett
Strait continued around the south of Kolombangara into Kula Gulf.
Destroyer officers had long complained about their ships being tied to a battle line of
cruisers. They coveted independent action where they could be free to conduct torpedo attacks
on the enemy without waiting for permission from a cruiser task force commander.66 With no
cruisers available to accompany them, Moosbrugger and his sailors would finally get their
chance to fight a surface battle without having to screen bigger warships. After discussing
Burke’s plan with Simpson, Moosbrugger decided to use it on this mission. According to this
plan, the American destroyers would enter Vella Gulf via Gizo Strait. Once in the gulf, Division
A-1 would lead the force north along the coast of Kolombangara toward New Georgia Sound
while Division A-2 steamed in a separate column off the starboard rear quarter of Division A-1.
If the destroyers happened to encounter enemy ships, Division A-1 would approach and launch a
torpedo attack, hopefully catching the Japanese by surprise. This division would then veer away
to avoid Japanese torpedoes and get into position to engage with gunfire. Division A-2 would
cover the first division with its guns while it conducted the initial torpedo attack. After the
torpedoes hit, Division A-2 would engage with gunfire and launch a second torpedo attack if
necessary. The two forces could keep track of each other’s location using the SG radar and
communicate by TBS.
Rear Admiral Wilkinson approved the plan and Moosbrugger’s force departed Tulagi at
1130 on 6 August. A little after 1730, Moosbrugger received a report that a search plane had
spotted a Japanese force headed for Vella Gulf that could possibly arrive that night. This report
verified the earlier intelligence provided by Rear Admiral Wilkinson. The destroyers
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approached the New Georgia group from the south, passing Rendova Island and arriving off
Gizo near 2200 that evening. Assuming positions as called for in the plan, the force proceeded
through Gizo Strait into Vella Gulf searching the dark, overcast night with SG radar. After
cruising eastward towards Blackett Strait, the force turned north and steamed along the western
shores of Kolombangara. Dunlap made a radar contact at 2318 and spent some time tracking it
before operators determined it to be a phantom contact. Immediately after discarding the
phantom, the Dunlap’s radar operators reported another blip at 2333. This blip would prove to
be no phantom.67
Four Japanese destroyers had entered Vella Gulf that night, steaming toward Blackett
Strait. With Kula Gulf increasingly patrolled by American ships, the Japanese had started using
Vella Gulf for their resupply missions. The format of such missions had been repeated a few
times in past weeks and had proved successful for the Japanese. Per the plan, they would cruise
through Vella Gulf using darkness to shield them from Allied air attack. Entering Blackett
Strait, the destroyers would unload supplies or troops onto waiting barges that would then
transfer the materiel and men to Kolombangara. After unloading, the destroyers would head
back to their bases at Shortland or Rabaul hopefully avoiding contact with Allied aircraft. For
this particular mission, destroyers Hagikaze, Arashi, Kawakaze, and Shigure had departed
Rabaul at 0300 on August 6 under the command of Captain Sugiura Kaju. The ships carried
over 900 troops and 50 tons of supplies for the garrison on Kolombangara. Captain Hara
Tameichi, commander of Shigure, had just completed a mission to Kolombangara a few days
earlier using the same plan. He was concerned about repeating the same format and feared that
the Allies would discern the Japanese intentions and be waiting with an ambush. Hara voiced
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his concerns in an 4 August conference of officers held to discuss the mission, but Sugiura
overruled him and decided to proceed.68
The Japanese ships cruised into Vella Gulf with Hagikaze leading Arashi and Kawakaze.
Shigure’s old engines prevented her from maintaining the same speed as the other destroyers so
she lagged slightly behind the other ships in the rear. The Japanese sailors remained unaware
that they were being tracked by American radar. Dunlap’s radar now showed four blips on its
screen. Moosbrugger reported the contacts on TBS and got verification from Craven that other
ships were also picking up the contacts on their radar. At 2340, Moosbrugger implemented his
plan of attack by ordering the ships of Division A-1 (Dunlap, Craven, and Maury) to launch
torpedoes. At a range of roughly 4,500 yards, twenty-four torpedoes hit the water and headed for
the Japanese column. Moosbrugger then led his ships in a turn towards the east in order to avoid
possible Japanese torpedoes. After several long minutes, the Americans detected three huge
explosions followed by a succession of smaller explosions. They had achieved their surprise
torpedo attack.69
The torpedoes had hit the first three Japanese destroyers (Hagikaze, Arashi, and
Kawakaze). Kawakaze took a direct hit into one of her magazines and exploded in a huge
fireball. Hagikaze and Arashi, although both crippled by hits, tried to fire at the American
destroyers. According to Hara, Shigure’s lookouts had spotted the American ships moments
before the explosions and had launched her own torpedoes into the water. Spotting torpedo
wakes, Hara ordered the Shigure to conduct evasive maneuvers. One torpedo hit Shigure in the
rudder, but fortunately for the Japanese, it proved to be a dud. None of the torpedoes fired by the
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Japanese destroyer hit any targets. Temporarily withdrawing from the action under the cover of
a smokescreen, Shigure began to reload torpedoes and prepare for a second attack.70
Per Moosbrugger’s plan, Simpson led the ships of Division A-2 (Lang, Stack, Sterett) in a
sharp turn to the southwest after Division A-1 fired torpedoes. After these torpedoes exploded,
Lang opened fire on the burning Japanese vessels with her 5-inch guns at 2346 followed by the
Sterett a minute later. The torpedo officer aboard Stack reported to the captain that he had a
good firing solution so that destroyer launched four torpedoes at the enemy before joining Lang
and Sterett in hosing the Japanese with 5-inch fire.71 Their target was probably Kawakaze which
sank quickly. After turning south to rejoin the action, the ships of Division A-1 also started
firing on the Japanese vessels at 2355. These ships continued firing as the division swung to the
northwest passing just to the north of the burning wrecks. While they kept watch for other
enemy forces, Division A-2 changed course to the east and mopped up the damaged Japanese
ships. The gunfire coming from Arashi and Hagikaze had ended by midnight, but they
continued to receive punishing fire from both American divisions. At 0010, Arashi exploded in
a huge fireball seen for miles around. The floating wreck of Hagikaze became the sole target of
the Americans a few minutes later and also exploded and sank. Torpedoes from Lang finished
off the Arashi by 0030.
Meanwhile, Shigure had reloaded torpedoes and returned to the scene of action. Hara
could not establish radio contact with his fellow destroyers and he quickly surmised that they had
been sunk. After seeing Arashi’s explosion, Hara realized that it would be suicide to remain in
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the area. He contacted Rabaul and received permission to withdraw. As for the survivors of the
Japanese destroyers, their only hope was to make their way to nearby Kolombangara. As
ordered by Moosbrugger, Simpson’s division tried to pick them up as prisoners but the Japanese
swam away as the destroyers approached. Moosbrugger and Simpson laid on a course for Tulagi
and steamed away shortly after 0100. They had sunk three Japanese destroyers while sustaining
no battle damage or fatalities. Around 300 of the Japanese soldiers and sailors made it to
Kolombangara, but nearly 1,200 perished in the waters of Vella Gulf. The Americans had won a
smashing victory.72
What had the American destroyer sailors done to accomplish such a feat of arms?
Contemporary reports praised radar and cautiously endorsed the tactics used at Vella Gulf. They
realized the importance of training ships in both individual performance and in operating as part
of a team using good communications and planning. In addition, they also recognized that
destroyers could be major players in surface battles instead of being solely used as screens for
larger warships.73 Obviously, the Americans had the benefit of good intelligence before they
started. In addition, Moosbrugger was an excellent commander who used a good battle plan and
effectively controlled his forces in battle. The tactics used by the Americans that involved
separating their forces and withholding gunfire before firing torpedoes violated naval dogma
concerning the supremacy of the gun and concentration of forces. Nonetheless, no one could
argue with the results such tactics achieved at Vella Gulf.
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Technology and training also proved crucial to the success of the Americans. Increased
training in both night combat and torpedo attacks benefited sailors because they became familiar
with the assets and liabilities of their weapons. Before the battle at Vella Gulf, American sailors
deactivated the faulty magnetic exploders and set the depth settings at minimum values in order
to compensate for the torpedoes running too deep.74 As a result, the torpedoes fired during the
battle worked very well. Such success demonstrated the importance of the destroyer as a torpedo
platform and proved its capability as an effective surface-fighting warship.
Tipping the balance in favor of the Americans, radar had become essential for navigating
and fighting in the dark. Ships now had Combat Information Centers (CICs) that coordinated the
massive amount of information generated during the modern naval battle (discussion of CIC
development follows later in chapter). The CIC processed communication reports, radar
contacts, air plots, and other information and fed it to the captain on the bridge who used the data
to maneuver and fight the ship. On vessels that served as flagships, the CIC was extremely
important in aiding the task force commander while he controlled ships in operations and battle.
Such technology proved vital in the success at Vella Gulf.
The Americans appeared to have finally found a solution to their problems in winning
night battles; however, the enemy response, the skill of a commander and the individual ships,
and the fortunes of war can offset the best laid plans. The American defeat off Vella Lavella in
October 1943 illustrated this point. Allied forces had moved to Vella Lavella as part of a
leapfrog strategy crafted to bypass and isolate Japanese strongholds instead of expending men,
materiel, and time taking enemy-held islands one by one. After the fighting ended on New
Georgia in August, 1943, American commanders chose to bypass the Japanese base on
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Kolombangara and take lightly held Vella Lavella instead. A small force of Americans landed at
Barakoma on the island’s east shore in mid-August and began to build an airbase. They
gradually moved northwest across the island capturing a Japanese barge base at Horaniu on the
north shore in September. Relieving the American combat forces, New Zealand troops
continued the drive and had nearly 600 Japanese cornered on the northwest tip of Vella Lavella
by the beginning of October.
Meanwhile, the Japanese decided to withdraw from the Central Solomons and
concentrate on reinforcing their strongholds on Bougainville and around Rabaul. They
evacuated their base at Kolombangara in September and early October despite Allied efforts to
blockade the island and isolate the garrison. Other bases on Santa Isabel and Gizo islands were
also abandoned by the Japanese. With these evacuations, only the garrisons on Choiseul and
Vella Lavella remained to be withdrawn. The Japanese had time to evacuate Choiseul but the
pressure from the New Zealand troops on Vella Lavella forced the Japanese to take immediate
action to remove the 600 men left on the island. Their attempt at evacuation sparked the Battle
of Vella Lavella.75
Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji commanded the Japanese evacuation force. According to his
plan, three older destroyers would cover the actual evacuation force that consisted of subchasers,
torpedo boats, and barges. Six other destroyers would screen this force and attack any American
ships that ventured into the Vella Lavella area. The destroyers departed Rabaul early on the
morning of 6 October 1943. As Ijuin’s force passed Bougainville that evening, he detached
Captain Hara Tameichi with Shigure and Samidare along with the three old destroyers to
rendezvous with the evacuation force near Shortland. The evacuation force had left Buin, a base
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in southern Bougainville, late that afternoon. Ijuin’s remaining destroyers (Akigumo, Isokaze,
Kazegumo, and Yugumo) steamed onwards toward Marquana Bay off the northwest tip of Vella
Lavella. Aware that he had been spotted by American aircraft, Ijuin hoped that his dispersal of
forces would confuse his enemy. After escorting the old destroyers and the evacuation force to
the area, Hara’s two destroyers would steam to rejoin Ijuin. The Japanese admiral hoped to
engage the attention of any American force that he encountered while Shigure and Samidare
delivered a torpedo attack into the enemy flank. 76
Rear Admiral Wilkinson received a report on 5 October that the Japanese might send
another evacuation force into the area. Using Task Group 31.2 again, he dispatched Commander
Frank Walker, Commander Desron 4, and the three destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier, and
O’Bannon to sweep the area between Choiseul and Vella Lavella on the night of 5-6 October.
They detected no Japanese but lingered along the coast of Choiseul the next day. During the
afternoon of 6 October, Wilkinson received reports that a Japanese force of nine destroyers was
heading towards Vella Lavella and could arrive in Marquana Bay that night. The Rear Admiral
sent Walker’s force to intercept the Japanese and detached three more destroyers under
Commander Harold Larson from a New Georgia convoy to join Walker at Vella Lavella. The
two American destroyer forces planned to rendezvous around 2300.
Walker’s three destroyers reached the Vella Lavella area first. Along the way, they had
been harassed by Japanese sea planes that dropped bombs and flares around the destroyers.
Walker’s force suffered no hits, but the planes reported his position to Ijuin. Unfortunately for
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the Americans, they lost any chance of conducting a surprise attack like they had achieved at
Vella Gulf. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their pilots erred and reported Walker’s force to
consist of four cruisers and three destroyers. Fearing the radar-controlled guns of American
cruisers, Ijuin conducted the subsequent battle differently than he would have if he had known
that he faced an inferior force of only three destroyers. This error in intelligence would plague
Ijuin later that evening.77 The evacuation force of small barges and boats continued to Vella
Lavella, but the three old destroyers withdrew. Hara’s two ships were ordered to hurriedly rejoin
Ijuin.
Shortly after 2230, Walker’s destroyers detected the Japanese forces on radar while
steaming northwest of Vella Lavella. Selfridge led the American column followed by Chevalier
and O’Bannon. The radar on all three ships showed two different groups of Japanese ships with
the first group containing five ships and the second group containing four. From the American’s
perspective, the second group appeared to be leaving the area while the first group interposed
itself between the second group and the American destroyers. At this time, the Japanese forces
were split into four groups. The smaller force of barges, subchasers, and torpedo boats were
trying to sneak past the American force to reach their troops on Vella Lavella. The three old
destroyers were leaving the area while Hara’s Shigure and Samidare raced towards Ijuin. Ijuin’s
four destroyers made up the fourth group of Japanese ships. The first group detected by the
American’s radar was probably Ijuin’s group while the second group was probably the retiring
old destroyers although the actual ship numbers did not correlate with the American’s radar. It
must be remembered that the SG radar, although an awesome advantage to the Americans, still
could be imperfectly interpreted by radar operators.
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Despite these discrepancies, the information on the American radar screens correlated
with their intelligence reports of nine Japanese ships reported to be in the area. Walker tried to
contact Larson’s force on the TBS, but Larson was still too far away and could not pick up the
radio signals. Despite being outnumbered, Walker decided to engage the Japanese and try to lure
them back toward Larson’s approaching force. He chose the first group of five ships (which was
actually Ijuin’s four destroyers) and began to close the range. As the Americans maneuvered
into position, Chevalier and O’Bannon reported several radar contacts in different directions and
classified them as torpedo boats. Walker ordered them to track the targets but remained
concentrated on Ijuin’s force.78
Meanwhile, Ijuin led his four destroyers in a complex series of course changes. He
managed to place his ships in a prime position to attack the American destroyers, but, for
unexplained reasons probably because he believed himself to be fighting cruisers, squandered the
advantage and wound up with his ships strung out in an exposed position. One ship, Yugumo,
managed to get in between the two opposing forces preventing the other three Japanese
destroyers from firing torpedoes. At 2255, both forces engaged the other with guns and
torpedoes. The Americans launched torpedoes first and followed a minute later with 5-inch
gunfire. Yugumo fired torpedoes and opened fire with her guns. Their torpedo solutions fouled
by Yugumo, the other Japanese ships could not use their Long Lances. Kazegumo fired her guns
while Ijuin led his ships in a radical course change to the south. Hit by a torpedo and several 5inch shells, Yugumo could not follow the other three ships and floated helplessly on the water
engulfed in flame and sinking.
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Walker shifted Selfridge’s attack towards Hara’s two ships. Chevalier started to join the
attack then turned to engage some torpedo boats that showed up on her radar. Suddenly, a
Japanese torpedo slammed into her side and exploded one of her magazines. The wounded
destroyer veered to the right into the path of the O’Bannon that had been following from behind.
Unable to avoid a collision, the O’Bannon rammed into Chevalier’s engine spaces. O’Bannon
managed to back clear of the torpedoed ship, but her bow had suffered heavy damage. Chevalier
could not be saved and had to be abandoned later in the night. Now, Walker only had Selfridge to
fight the Japanese force. As he tried to press his attack, torpedoes launched from Shigure and
Samidare streamed around his ship. Despite the best efforts of her crew, the Selfridge could not
avoid them all and one hit the ship at 2308. 79
Fortunately for Walker, Larson’s three destroyers now approached the battle site.
Japanese seaplanes reported his arrival to Ijuin who decided to break off the action that night and
retire. He ordered his destroyers to return to Rabaul but did not recall the evacuation force of
barges, subchasers, and torpedo boats. Continuing with their mission, they managed to slip
undetected behind the Americans and evacuate the 600 troops off Vella Lavella. After
torpedoing the burning hulk of Chevalier, the Americans withdrew towards Tulagi. The United
States Navy had lost one destroyer and suffered damage to two others and had failed to prevent
the evacuation of Vella Lavella. In comparison, the Japanese accomplished their mission that
cost them only one destroyer. After performing so ably at Vella Gulf, the Americans had
suffered another defeat.
In addition to being outnumbered, several factors contributed to the American’s defeat.
With Larson’s force not arriving at the scene of battle until after the action was over, the
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Americans found themselves unable to execute the plan that had worked at Vella Gulf where two
forces engaged the enemy from different directions. In addition, the Japanese knew that
American destroyers were approaching so the element of surprise that had benefited the United
States Navy at Vella Gulf could not be repeated. Finally, after the initial firing of torpedoes,
Walker chose to maneuver his ships so that he could continue the engagement by gunfire instead
of steering clear of torpedo-infested waters using radical course changes like those performed by
Moosbrugger at Vella Gulf.
Walker’s actions in fighting a superior force are a credit to his bravery and
aggressiveness, but it might have benefited the Americans had he decided to delay the action
until Larson joined up with him. In Walker’s defense, he could not contact Larson on the TBS
so he did not know when the rendezvous could be accomplished. From his perspective, had he
delayed, he would have lost a possible opportunity to interfere with a Japanese operation. Such
an action would be seen by Walker’s superiors as a lack of aggressive fighting spirit. Usually, it
benefited the careers of naval commanders to err on the side of aggression, not caution.
Nonetheless, both Larson’s and Walker’s forces could probably have changed the outcome of the
battle.
After the battle, the captains of both Selfridge and Chevalier asserted that the torpedoes
that struck their ships came from torpedo boats, not destroyers. Examination of Japanese
accounts, however, show that no torpedo boats operated near the ships. The only ones present in
the area were attached to the evacuation force and were too far away to participate in the battle.80
In all probability, the sightings reported on the American radar of torpedo boats were erroneous
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interpretations of the confused jumble of ships present around Vella Lavella. These incidents
coupled with the American radar reports at the beginning of the battle mentioned earlier show
that radar was not a magic crystal ball for the Americans that allowed them to know everything
about a tactical situation. Although a great asset, radar had to be used correctly to positively
influence a battle.
Even though he won a victory, Ijuin’s superiors criticized him for not using his ships
more effectively. Ijuin based the maneuvers that he conducted at the onset of the battle on the
assumption that he was fighting cruisers. When Ijuin started to fire torpedoes, he realized that
the ships were destroyers which meant that a different firing solution for his torpedoes had to
calculated because the presumed range to the American ships were wrong.81 Although Ijuin
never explained his subsequent maneuvers, he probably sought to regain a prime battle position
and made errors in his course changes that inhibited his force from engaging the Americans more
effectively. Despite his errors, the Japanese destroyers had again demonstrated their skill at
night combat.
These two battles and the experiences of the destroyers that fought in them demonstrate
how the American Navy changed its tactics, used its resources, and adapted new technology to
improve its performance in the night surface actions. American naval tactics continued to evolve
during the New Georgia phase. United States task forces and groups no longer hung around
Guadalcanal waiting for the Japanese to attack but boldly patrolled near enemy held islands such
as New Georgia, Kolombangara, and Vella Lavella. After torpedoes smashed cruisers at Kula
Gulf and Kolombangara, many American commanders finally began to respect the lethality of
Japanese torpedoes and realized that they must adapt their tactics to match the situation. The
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sharp maneuvers performed by Moosbrugger after he launched the torpedo attack at Vella Gulf
demonstrate that the Americans were applying these lessons to their tactics. Obviously, the
lesson had not been fully learned as evidenced by the lack of those same maneuvers at Vella
Lavella.
Except for instances such as Vella Gulf, the Japanese night combat tactics proved
successful most of the time, so they had less impetus to radically change their tactics. Their
failures could be attributed to bad luck or errors and misjudgments of the battle commanders as
opposed to faulty tactical doctrine. As for the Americans, the string of failures at Savo,
Tassafaronga, and Kolombangara proved the inadequacies of their doctrine. The key to solving
these problems did not lie in finding one plan that worked in all situations. Arleigh Burke
believed that no one plan could ensure victory all the time. Too many variables existed in battle
that could disrupt the best laid plans. In his view, skilled commanders with well-trained crews
that proved to be flexible and adaptable in their tactical doctrine comprised the real principles
that led to victory.82 The results that he would obtain during the next phase of battles would
substantiate his beliefs.
The United States Navy was also learning to use its resources more wisely. Although
transfer of ships among task groups occurred frequently, commanders were able to keep some
ships operating together for a period of time. This allowed them to train together and become
experienced in working as a team. The destroyers assigned to Task Group 31.2 at Tulagi usually
only served at that station for a few weeks before being assigned to another force; however, they
still had some time to train with the other destroyers as a unit and develop common
communication and operational protocols. As proved by Moosbrugger and his ships, such
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teamwork could provide substantial results in battle. The ships of Moosbrugger’s force had a
chance to work out a battle plan in addition to communications and navigation procedures. Such
a feat stands in contrast to battles in the Guadalcanal phase such as Tassafaronga where the
destroyers Lamson and Lardner joined Rear Admiral Wright’s task group immediately before
battle with no time to become acquainted with a plan.
Unfortunately, the American navy had to relearn this lesson at Vella Lavella. The
destroyers of Task Group 31.2 had been scattered over the area performing different tasks, so
Walker and Larson had to hurry into a battle with no chance to formulate a viable plan. As a
result, Walker fought a superior force and failed to impede the Japanese evacuation mission.
The Americans would carry this lesson into the Bougainville phase and apply it with excellent
results.
As in the first phase, technology again proved to be a critical factor. The American Navy
finally learned to correct its torpedo problems and started to gain a proper appreciation for the
Japanese torpedo. For communications, the Americans used TBS more effectively and had
standardized procedures that reduced confusion in battle. Both of these technologies proved
crucial to victory, but radar stood out as the key technology in these night battles. The United
States Navy had grown adept at using it for both fighting and navigation. They not only used in
their ships but onboard aircraft as well. The Black Cat PBY search planes accompanied naval
task forces and scouted for Japanese vessels lurking in the dark. The extra pair of eyes in the sky
benefited commanders immensely.
The navy used different types of radar for surface search, fire direction, and air search.
Early models of radar included sets such as the CXAM that did not have adequate resolution for
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smaller objects and used an indicating scope known as an A-scope that was difficult for
operators to read. Early radar training for sailors proved inadequate and the mixed results
achieved in its use caused many commanders to doubt its effectiveness.83 By the New Georgia
campaign, however, the newer SG radar had an improved scope and superior resolution so it
quickly proved invaluable to commanders.
The SG radar operated using an antenna fastened to a ship’s mast that both emitted the
concentrated radio beam and received the signal as it reflected off objects on the sea. The data
received were displayed on a Plot Position Indicator (PPI) scope that was a circular luminescent
screen that had the ship using the radar located at the center. Superior to the old A-scope, all the
objects detected by the radar were displayed on the screen according to their actual location
relative to the ship. At a glance, a skilled radar operator could determine the locations of other
ships and landmasses. Using basic principles of physics and geometry, distance, range, and
bearing (of moving objects) could be determined.84
Unlike the Guadalcanal phase, an increasing number of ships now possessed SG radar
and it became an essential piece of equipment when operating at night. One officer commented
that at night “you depended on the radar for everything.”85 Ships navigated with it, kept track of
allied ships with it, located the enemy with it, and used it to direct their gunfire. As mentioned
earlier, ships now used a Combat Information Center to coordinate and process information from
radar and communications. These centers replaced the bridge as the nerve center of the ship and
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proved especially valuable to commodores and admirals commanding groups of ships. Radar not
only allowed them to see the enemy but permitted them to keep track of their own ships in
addition to enemy vessels.
Realizing the need for ships to have a CIC, the Navy established a CIC training center at
Noumea on New Caledonia in early 1943. Older destroyers that did not have radar installed
when they were built received their SG radar sets from either periodic refits at stateside ports or
from auxiliary repair ships at bases such as Noumea.86 Once they received their radars, it
behooved them to develop a CIC somewhere on the ship. Later models would have a special
CIC built into the superstructure, but for now officers had to find space somewhere in the already
crowded vessel. For many destroyers, the chart room, which housed the numerous maps and
charts required for navigation at sea, became the CIC.
In addition to the SG set and PPI, the CIC contained a long chart table for keeping track
of the ship’s position. A moving Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT) represented the ship as it
moved across the sea. PPI contacts, ship movements, and other pieces of information were
plotted around the DRT on the table. This setup became the surface plot and served as a record
of the various operations and battles conducted by the individual ship and the fleet as a whole. A
smaller circular air plot was located nearby and served the same function for air contacts
reported by the air search radar. For destroyers, sixteen men usually staffed the CIC and
included a CIC officer, CIC evaluator (often the destroyer’s executive officer), plotters, radar
operators, communicators, and liaison officers who kept in contact with the guns and any
accompanying aircraft.87
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The CIC fed vital information to both the ship’s captain on the bridge and to the task
group commodore if located on the ship. It became a huge advantage in night operations
including the various battles fought during the campaign. Realizing the importance of radar’s
information, officers started requesting that multiple PPIs be established in other areas such as
the bridge so the information could be better disseminated.88 The use of SG radar, however, did
have its problems. Air masses, waves, and even birds could cause false contact images on the
PPI. In the heat of battle with ships scattered around the area, operators could misinterpret the
various blips on the PPI. An example of this occurred at Vella Lavella when Chevalier thought
enemy torpedo boats operated nearby. In addition, the early instruments proved somewhat
fragile and the shock of the ship’s guns firing could render them inoperable.89 The benefits of
the SG radar, however, far outweighed the problems. With proper training and use, sailors used
the radar to great advantage.
The Japanese also possessed various kinds of radar, but it was inferior to the American
radar sets and not widely used in the Solomon Campaigns. For the Japanese Navy, surface
search radar installed aboard ships included the Mark 2 Models 1, 2, and 3. During this time
period, destroyers usually used the Model 1 or 2. The Model 3 was not developed until late
1943. The Japanese lagged behind the Americans in radar research and the structure of its
electronic industry proved inefficient and cumbersome. The Japanese Navy, therefore, never
was able to implement radar as effectively as the Americans. Above all other factors, the
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advantage attained by the Americans using radar enabled them to counter the superb nightfighting talents of the Japanese seamen.90
Overall, the New Georgia campaign illustrated that the American Navy had improved its
ability to fight the night surface battles. Although they achieved mixed results over the course of
the campaign, the Americans now had the tactical experience, technological expertise, and
resources that they would use with great success as the fighting shifted northward to the island
Bougainville.
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CHAPTER 4
BOUGAINVILLE PHASE
During the early afternoon of 31 October 1943, Rear Admiral Aaron S. Merrill led a
force of four light cruisers and eight destroyers out of Port Purvis near Florida Island. His
mission was to support the Allied invasion of Bougainville by bombarding Japanese airfields
located at the northern and southern ends of the island. Once the bombardments had been
accomplished, Merrill was to screen the Allied invasion force from possible Japanese surface
forces. Before the sailors and officers under Merrill’s command returned to Tulagi, they would
experience a three-day odyssey in which they would fight four engagements with the Japanese
including a major surface battle.91
Shortly after midnight on 1 November, Merrill’s Task Force 39 arrived off northern
Bougainville and commenced its bombardment run. The Japanese had two airfields in the area:
Bonis on the northern shore of Bougainville and Buka on the small island of the same name just
across the Buka Passage (See Map in Appendix). The 6-inch and 5-inch guns of the four
cruisers pounded the airfields while the accompanying destroyers engaged shore batteries and
other coastal targets. The Japanese guns along the coast fired upon the American ships, but they
only managed one hit on the cruiser Montpelier. Fortunately for the Americans, the shell did not
score a direct hit and Merrill’s typewriter became the only casualty from the blast. A few
Japanese planes also dropped flares and bombs around the ships, but they were as ineffective as
the shore batteries.
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Completing their bombardment at 0038, Merrill’s force steamed south and arrived off
southern Bougainville at dawn where it began to bombard the Japanese airfields in the Shortland
Islands. The Japanese were alerted this time, however, and their shore batteries peppered the
waters around the American force with 3-inch and 6-inch shells. Despite several near misses,
they only succeeded in hitting the American destroyer Dyson in the bow. After completing this
bombardment, Merrill’s force steamed to the vicinity of the Treasury Islands north of Vella
Lavella where it awaited word of any Japanese surface strike. Later that day, American planes
detected a Japanese surface force heading toward Bougainville and Merrill sallied forth to meet
the enemy.
In the early morning hours of 2 November, Merrill’s four cruisers and eight destroyers
battled a Japanese force consisting of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers
near Empress Augusta Bay. The Americans experienced some trouble in ship identification and
maneuvering, but they managed to repel the Japanese surface force sinking one destroyer and
one light cruiser while damaging four other ships. In return, the Americans did not lose a single
ship although several of them sustained damage. Destroyer Foote, whose bow was smashed by a
torpedo, had to be towed back to Tulagi, but the others could steam under their own power. This
battle, dubbed the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, ended in another American surface victory.
Task Force 39 had not finished with its mission, however, because it had to withstand a
vigorous Japanese air attack at dawn. Enemy aircraft swarmed around the ships, but they only
scored two hits on Montpelier that caused no major damage. With the aid of Allied aircraft,
Merrill’s ships repelled the attack without loss of life. As Merrill’s weary force headed for
home, it had to escort transports that had unloaded troops at Bougainville. On the afternoon of 3
November after three days with very little sleep and intense action, Merrill’s exhausted sailors
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arrived at Purvis Bay where they could rest, resupply, and refuel. Although, their performance
had not been flawless, the Americans had achieved an impressive feat of arms by conducting
multiple missions successfully over a small time period. Compared to the debacle at
Tassafaronga almost a year previous, the United States Navy appeared to have improved its
performance across the board particularly in the realm of night surface combat.
The island of Bougainville proved to be the last stop for the Allies in the Solomon
Islands. Bypassing Japanese strongholds on the southern part of the island, American forces
landed on the western coast near the center at Empress Augusta Bay on 1 November 1943.
Initially, the ground forces faced relatively little resistance from the Japanese so they established
a defensive perimeter and constructed airfields. Not until March 1944 would the Japanese be
able to cross the jungles and mountains from their main base in the south to attack the American
perimeter and airfields. The attack failed after a ferocious fight and for the rest of the war the
remaining Japanese forces posed little threat to the Allied position on the island. At sea, the
Americans applied lessons learned from past experience and won victories against Japanese
surface forces in Empress Augusta Bay and off Cape St. George.92
Learning from past mistakes, the American Navy had, by the Bougainville phase, finally
developed a feasible doctrine for surface combat in the confined waters of the Solomons. The
victories at Empress Augusta Bay and Cape St. George illustrated the Americans’ ability to adapt
their technology, tactics, and resources to attain a successful doctrine. The Japanese on the other
hand were hampered by a lack of effective radar and failed to adjust their tactics adequately to
meet the American challenge. As for resources, they failed to use their ships wisely committing
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them piecemeal to various campaigns and losing valuable ships to submarine, air, and surface
attack without gaining an appreciable advantage. As a result, the awesome fighting ability of the
Japanese seaman was squandered and the Japanese defensive perimeter slowly shrunk like a
deflating balloon.
In addition to enjoying technical advantages such as radar, the Americans worked out a
tactical doctrine that emphasized the torpedo and independent action by destroyers. The
commander of Merrill’s destroyers, Captain Arleigh Burke, had worked with other naval officers
to develop a tactical doctrine for destroyers that he believed would improve the Navy’s
performance in the night surface battles. After arriving in the South Pacific in early 1943, Burke
started studying the action reports from the previous battles. These reports coupled with
experiences from training exercises convinced Burke that the key to victory lie in allowing
destroyers to operate independently from cruisers with the ability to launch torpedo attacks
without first getting the approval of the task force commander.93
In past battles such as Tassafaronga, destroyer commanders experienced delays in getting
approval to launch torpedoes that ruined their targeting solutions and negated the effects of any
torpedoes the ships eventually fired. Also, the cruisers with which the destroyers were grouped
usually started firing as soon as they detected the enemy on their radars, giving away the position
of the task force and removing the element of surprise needed for a successful torpedo attack.
Night surface battles unfolded quickly and by the time destroyer commanders got permission
from the task force commander to launch torpedoes, the optimal moment had passed. Operating
separately and with authority to fire torpedoes, destroyers could range in front of the cruiser line,
launch a devastating surprise torpedo attack, and then maneuver to assist the cruisers as they
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opened fire with their guns. However, such independence ran counter to the common wisdom of
the time. Problems of communication and identification in the night between separate groups of
ships caused great concern among many commanders. They feared a repeat of the confusion
experienced by the different groups of ships at the Savo Island disaster in August 1942. Also,
few task force commanders relished the thought of delegating part of their authority. Such views
prejudiced many officers against dividing their forces and allowing the destroyers greater
freedom of action. 94
As discussed in Chapter 2, Burke missed his chance to implement his plan in August
1943. His command had been transferred out of the Solomons area and Commander
Moosbrugger used Burke’s plan to win a substantial American victory at the Battle of Vella
Gulf. By the first of November, however, Burke had arrived back in the combat zone as
Commander Desron 23 that included Desdiv 45 (Charles Ausburne, Dyson, Stanly, and Claxton)
and Desdiv 46 (Spence, Thatcher, Foote, and Converse). In addition to squadron command,
Burke personally commanded Desdiv 45 while Commander Bernard Austin led Desdiv 46.
These eight destroyers sailed with Merrill and Task Force 39 at Empress Augusta Bay.
The battle at Empress Augusta Bay resulted from a Japanese attempt to achieve another
victory such as the one they won at Savo Island. As soon as the Japanese learned of the Allied
landing at Bougainville on 1 November, they dispatched Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro to land
reinforcements and attack any enemy ships that he found. They hoped to ravage the transports
unloading troops and supplies and check the advance toward Rabaul. For this task, Omori had
two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro, supported by two destroyer squadrons. Rear Admiral
Ijuin Matsuji led one squadron that consisted of his flagship, light cruiser Sendai, and three
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destroyers (Shigure, Samidare, and Shiratsuyu). Rear Admiral Osugi Morikazu led the other
squadron that consisted of his flagship, light cruiser Agano, and three destroyers (Naganami,
Hatsukaze, and Wakatsuki). Five old destroyer transports carrying nearly 1,000 men
accompanied the warships to Bougainville. 95
As mentioned earlier, Merrill’s ships were waiting near the Treasury Islands for word of
any possible Japanese surface threat to the American transports at Bougainville. American
planes had detected Omori’s force near Rabaul and kept a steady stream of reports on its
progress going to Allied headquarters. Wasting no time, Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson,
commander of the forces landing at Empress Augusta Bay, ordered Merrill to steam north and
intercept the Japanese ships. Unfortunately for Merrill, he had only four of his destroyers with
him. The bombardment missions against Buka and the Shortlands had depleted the fuel supply
of the American destroyers. All of them were Fletcher-class vessels that used up prodigious
amounts of fuel at high speeds; therefore, Captain Burke led the four ships of Desdiv 45 to
Kolombangara where they refueled from a fuel barge off Kula Gulf. After drinking their fill, the
four ships hurried back to rendezvous with Merrill and rejoined the Task Force at 2330 on the
night of 1 November. Commander Austin’s Desdiv 46 also had low fuel levels, but they did not
have time to steam all the way to Kolombangara. Soon after Burke rejoined the force, Merrill
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led his force on a low-speed approach to the seas west of Empress Augusta Bay to intercept
Omori. Austin and the four ships of his division would have to fight with the fuel on hand.96
Omori’s force approached Bougainville in three groups. The first group steamed in the
center of the Japanese formation and consisted of Omori’s flagship, Haguro, and Myoko. The
second group steamed on the right of the Japanese formation and consisted of Ijuin’s squadron.
On the left, Osugi’s squadron formed the third group of ships. American planes equipped with
radar, SB-24 bombers and PBY “Black Cat” Catalinas, shadowed Omori and plagued him with
periodic attacks. In addition to slowing Omori, they reported his progress to Merrill. Due to the
delays and reports of American warships near Empress Augusta Bay, Omori recommended to his
superiors at Rabaul that the transports be recalled. His force would continue to Bougainville and
attack any American ships that they found.
Merrill arranged his forces in a column with Burke’s Desdiv 45 in the van, the four light
cruisers (Montpelier, Cleveland, Columbia, and Denver) in the center, and Austin’s Desdiv 46 in
the rear. Prior to the battle, Burke had explained his thoughts on destroyer doctrine to Merrill
and had gotten his approval to launch an independent torpedo attack without having to obtain
Merrill’s permission. According to plan, Desdiv 45 would strike first at the enemy from one
flank while Desdiv 46 would attack from the other flank. Once torpedoes struck their targets,
Merrill’s cruisers would engage with gunfire supported by the guns of the destroyers. In the
days leading up to the battle, Desdiv 45 had time to train as a unit and with Merrill’s cruisers.
Austin’s four destroyers, however, had only united right before the Bougainville operation so
they had neither time for training as a unit nor with Merrill’s cruisers.97
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American naval officers had finally began to recognize the lethal range of the Japanese
torpedo, so Merrill planned to keep his cruisers at a healthy distance from the Japanese ships. He
believed that what he sacrificed in gunfire accuracy would be compensated for in safety from the
long-range torpedo. In addition to fighting at long ranges, Merrill also planned a series of course
changes and non-routine speed changes to foul Japanese torpedo fire-control solutions. With
these tactical innovations, he hoped that the heavy losses at Tassafaronga and Kolombangara
would not be repeated.98
The American force had steamed to a point nearly 50 miles to the west of Empress
Augusta Bay when it detected Omori’s ships at 0229 on the morning of November 2. The three
Japanese groups were arrayed roughly north to south with Ijuin’s squadron in the north and
Osugi’s squadron on the south. Omori’s two heavy cruisers occupied the middle position. From
aircraft contact reports, the Japanese knew that American ships lurked somewhere ahead in the
darkness, but they had not yet spotted Merrill’s force. Once again, American radar had trumped
Japanese optics. Merrill had the element of surprise if he could only take advantage of it.
Burke’s flagship, Charles Ausburne, detected the Japanese on her radar at 0231. Per the
plan, Burke immediately ordered the four ships of his division to make a torpedo run on the
enemy vessels. Charles Ausburne, Dyson, Stanly, and Claxton dashed away from Merrill’s
column and plowed through the seas toward Ijuin’s squadron. After closing to within 5,600
yards, they swept by on the Japanese ships’ port bow and launched half their torpedoes. The
American destroyers wheeled starboard to clear the area and avoid any possible enemy torpedoes
heading their way. As the division headed northeast, Claxton developed a good solution on one
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of the Japanese ships and fired her remaining torpedoes. Burke’s force steamed away from the
Japanese column and anxiously awaited for the explosions that meant their torpedoes had found
their target. After seeing the Japanese ships swerve to a new course, Burke and his officers
feared the torpedo attack had been futile, but then they noticed explosions among the enemy
ships. The American destroyer captains thought that they had sunk at least one Japanese ship.
When they saw the cruisers opening fire on the Japanese at 0249, Burke’s ships joined in with
their 5-inch guns for a few minutes, then stopped as the distance between them and the enemy
grew. Burke found his division had scattered so, wanting to avoid a wild melee, he maneuvered
to collect his destroyers together as a group before he headed back toward the Japanese ships.99
Meanwhile, Ijuin’s forces had finally spotted the American ships and fired their
torpedoes while they maneuvered to get out of the way of the American torpedoes. Contrary to
what Burke and his officers believed, the Japanese maneuvers thwarted the American attack and
they suffered no hits from American torpedoes. The Japanese, however, did not escape
unscathed. Destroyer Shigure barely missed being smashed by the larger cruiser Sendai as they
changed course in the dark sea. Samidare and Shiratsuyu did collide which damaged both
vessels so severely that they had to withdraw from the battle. As the two ships retreated,
Samidare got hit by three 5-inch shells, but both she and Shiratsuyu managed to escape and
eventually made their way back to Rabaul.
Shortly after Burke separated from Task Force 39 to make his torpedo run, Merrill had
ordered his cruisers and destroyers to change course from north to south. Austin reported that he
now had the Japanese forces on his radar, so Merrill released him to make a torpedo attack on the
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Japanese ships in the center. Foote had become separated from the rest of Austin’s division
during the course change so Austin led only three of his destroyers on the torpedo run. As Foote
sped to catch up with her fellow destroyers, a Japanese torpedo hit her and blew a portion of her
bow off in the water. Foote would survive, but she could no longer participate in the battle.100
Merrill’s cruisers had already initiated gunfire on the Japanese ships. When he saw the
Japanese ships making course change, Merrill realized that the element of surprise had been lost,
so he did not wait for the torpedo explosions before he opened fire. Typical for a night action,
the Americans concentrated their fire on the biggest radar blip which turned out to be the light
cruiser Sendai. The Japanese cruiser got pummeled by the American guns and soon became a
burning wreck. Destroyer Shigure watched helplessly as their squadron flagship became
inundated with fires and explosions. Shigure maneuvered fruitlessly for awhile trying to fix the
positions of Omori’s ships and Merrill’s cruisers, but she contributed nothing else to the action
that night. She later withdrew toward Rabaul.101
Merrill led his cruisers in a series of radical course and speed changes. These changes
not only served to foul Japanese torpedoes but also kept the Japanese ships in range of Merrill’s
guns and maintained Task Force 39 between Omori’s force and the transports near Empress
Augusta Bay. The cruisers shifted their fire to Omori’s heavy cruisers and Osugi’s squadron
around 0310. In return, Omori’s heavy cruisers fired back at the Americans and used starshells to
illuminate Merrill’s force. Even though the ships had their positions revealed by the Japanese
star shells, the cruisers sustained no hits in the early part of the action. Eventually, three shells
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struck Denver but none of the four cruisers were critically damaged. Merrill ordered a smoke
screen to be laid and continued the fight.
Austin tried to lead his remaining three destroyers in a torpedo attack, but while changing
course to stay clear of the cruisers’ fire and trying to attain a good position to fire torpedoes, the
Spence and Thatcher collided. Both ships were damaged but tried to continue the fight. In
addition to the collision damage, a Japanese shell struck the Spence and damaged some
engineering equipment which slowed her speed. Despite these setbacks, the ships managed to
finally get into position to deliver a torpedo attack against Omori’s heavy cruisers. Austin’s CIC
officer misidentified the ships as friendly, however, and the Americans lost a chance to inflict a
severe blow on the enemy.102
Austin’s division headed for the northern group and finally attained a position to launch a
torpedo attack. At 0328, the Spence and Converse launched torpedoes at the remnants of Ijuin’s
squadron. They probably hit the wreck of the Sendai which has not sunk yet. The American
destroyers chased the retiring Samidare and Shiratsuyu and attacked them with torpedoes and
gunfire. Other than the three shell hits on Samidare, the Americans caused the ships no further
damage. A little after 0400, the shell hit that Spence received earlier finally caused her to slow
down enough to withdraw from the fight. Austin ordered Converse and Thatcher to continue
chasing the Japanese ships while Spence started to retire from the action.103
As Omori’s heavy cruisers maneuvered to avoid American shells, his and Osugi’s
column became entangled. The heavy cruiser Myoko collided with the destroyer Hatsukaze and
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almost cut the smaller vessel in half. The Hatsukaze was left behind as Omori’s force continued
the fight. Myoko and Haguro launched torpedoes and kept lobbing shells at the American ships.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, Osugi’s squadron did not appear to contribute much to the fight
but tried to follow Omori’s vessels. After trading shots with the American cruisers for awhile,
Omori lost sight of his enemy in the smokescreen ordered by Merrill. Unable to see the
Americans, Omori believed that he had sunk several of the cruisers. Omori’s force was now
scattered and he had lost Sendai and the use of three destroyers. Believing that he faced a far
more superior force coupled with the threat of Allied air attacks at dawn, Omori ordered his
ships to withdraw to Rabaul at 0337.104
Merrill ordered his cruisers to cease fire at 0349. After cruising around the area looking
for more targets for a few minutes, he began to recollect his force. As mentioned earlier,
Austin’s destroyers were chasing the remnants of Ijuin’s force, but Converse and Thatcher
finally broke off the chase and returned to the battle area. As for Spence, the damaged destroyer
found itself the target of gunfire from Desdiv 45! Burke’s division had just reassembled and
returned to the combat area when the cruisers ceased fire. Searching the area, the ships of
Desdiv 45 found the battered Sendai and sent torpedoes into her that finally sank her. Next,
Burke’s ships started firing at what appeared to be another enemy vessel. This ship turned out to
be the Spence who quickly indentified herself. Fortunately for the Americans, Burke’s salvos
caused no damage. As Spence headed to rendezvous with Merrill’s cruisers, she detected the
damaged Hatsukaze. Spence opened fire but did not have enough ammunition to finish the job.
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Austin radioed Burke who was only too happy to sink the Japanese ship. Desdiv 45 opened fire
on the Hatsukaze which rolled over and sank as dawn was breaking over the battle area.105
Merrill reassembled his ships and ordered the torpedoed Foote to be taken under tow by
the Claxton. The battle won, Task Force 39 continued its mission. Despite the damage to the
Foote and other vessels, Task Force 39 had lost no ships and had repelled a Japanese surface
force. Omori, on the other hand, had failed in his mission to sink the transports and had lost one
cruiser and one destroyer in addition to sustaining damage to several of his other vessels. The
American plan, although imperfectly implemented, produced good results overall, especially
when compared to the debacles that had occurred in previous actions. Although the American
gunfire and torpedo attacks lacked accuracy, they had managed to avoid the devastating gunfire
and torpedo attacks of the Japanese. Finally, the Americans had realized the potential of the
Japanese torpedo and had taken steps such as radical course and speed changes in addition to
maintaining a healthy range in order to alleviate the danger. As for tactics, the American plan of
launching independent destroyer action confused the Japanese even though the torpedoes did not
do much damage. In addition, the Americans had trouble keeping track of ships and realized that
a better system of radar/radio recognition known as Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) was
needed. Nonetheless, Merrill’s and Burke’s tactics had borne fruit this time albeit imperfectly.
It remained to be seen whether the victory could be repeated.106
Less than a month later, Burke led his destroyers in the Battle of Cape St. George and
proved that the tactical doctrine could indeed be repeated with success. Like the victory at Vella

105

AA Report, Comdesron 23, November 4, 1943; Bernard Austin Oral History.
Marsh, “Tactics Rule”; Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 235; Battle of Empress Augusta Bay Staff
Presentation, May 24, 1944, Naval War College; United States Navy Battle Experience, #14, Chapter 66: Empress
Augusta Bay, Box 261, Battle Experiences, NHHCC.
106

78

Gulf in August 1943, this action was fought entirely by destroyers and it was an overwhelming
American victory. Like many of these night action, it stemmed from a Japanese attempt to
reinforce one of their island garrisons. After the Allies landed on Bougainville, the Japanese
believed that Buka Island might be next. They had an airfield on the island, but Allied air attacks
hit the base so often in November that it became inoperable. Wanting to hold the island, the
Japanese made a decision to evacuate about 700 air personnel who were now useless without an
operational airfield and reinforce the garrison with 920 army troops to resist the expected Allied
invasion. Captain Kagawa Kiyoto was assigned to accomplish this task with five destroyers.
Three of them would carry troops (Amagiri, Yugiri, and Uzuki) while two operated as the screen
(Onami and Makinami).107
The Allies had intelligence the Japanese would try to reinforce their troops on Buka. On
24 November 1943, Captain Burke and five ships of his Desron 23 received orders to patrol the
Rabaul-Buka line and intercept any Japanese forces they found. The two nights previous to this
one, Burke and his destroyers had operated to the west of Bougainville covering supply missions
to the troops at Empress Augusta Bay. Low on fuel, the ships were refueling at the barge near
Kula Gulf when they received their orders to intercept the Japanese force. For this mission,
Burke had three ships of his Desdiv 45 (Charles Ausburne, Claxton, and Dyson) in addition to
two ships of Commander Austin’s Desdiv 46 (Spence and Converse). Spence suffered from
engine problems and could only make 30-31 knots instead of the normal 35 knots, so Burke
would have to plan on operating at reduced speeds. He based his plan on the doctrine used at
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Vella Gulf and Empress Augusta Bay. One division would attack with torpedoes while the other
division would cover the first. Once the first division had veered out of the way, the second
division would then attack from another flank. This time, Burke wanted to keep both divisions
on the same side of the enemy force. He did not want a repeat of Empress Augusta Bay where
his and Austin’s divisions became separated and could not operate together.108
During the evening of 24 November, Kagawa’s ships reached Buka and the three
destroyer-transports under Captain Yamashiro Katsumori unloaded the army troops and
evacuated the air personnel. As Yamashiro was finishing his operations, Kagawa led Onami and
Makinami on the route to Rabaul to screen for enemy ships. Kagawa intended for Yamashiro’s
force to catch up to his west of Buka and then they would proceed back to Rabaul. As Kagawa
left Buka, he tangled with some American PT boats that reported his presence to their
headquarters. When Burke heard the contact report, he knew that Japanese ships were definitely
operating in the area that night.
Burke planned to intercept the Rabaul-Buka line about 55 miles to the west of Buka
around 0145 on the morning of 25 November. The three ships of Desdiv 45 steamed in column
heading due north with Austin’s two destroyers in a separate column to the southwest. At 0141,
Spence, Claxton, and Dyson detected enemy ships to the east of their position. Burke thought
that they had detected three ships, but in fact this contact was the Onami and Makinami under
Kagawa. At 0145, the three ships of Desdiv 45 peeled off from the American formation and
made a torpedo run at the Japanese ships. Once they were within range, the three destroyers
launched fifteen torpedoes into the water and made an immediate turn to the right to avoid any
possible enemy torpedoes. For four and a half long minutes, Burke’s men waited to see if their
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torpedoes would find their mark. They were rewarded with three explosions. This time, their
torpedoes had hit the targets.109
Kagawa remained unaware of the Americans’ presence until right before the torpedoes
hit. He tried to go into evasive maneuvers, but it was too late. Onami disintegrated in a
spectacular explosion while Makinami split into two pieces but stayed afloat. Right after the
torpedoes exploded, Burke’s ships detected the three ships of Yamashiro’s transport unit arriving
in the area. He set off to attack these ships and ordered Austin to finish off the survivors of the
first torpedo attack. Spence and Converse approached Makinami and started pummeling her with
guns and torpedoes. One section slid beneath the waves, but the remaining section did not want
to sink. For nearly an hour, the American destroyers kept up the attack. Finishing off a damaged
ship was not a safe task because the Japanese managed to fire some torpedoes at the two
American vessels. One hit the Converse in her engine room but turned out to be a dud. Luck
seemed to be on the side of the Americans this day. Finally, the remaining part of the Makinami
sank at 0253.110
Meanwhile, Burke tried to get into position to launch torpedoes on Yamashiro’s
destroyers. The Japanese commander, however, had seen the explosions among Kagawa’s
screen so he knew American ships were in the area. Loaded with evacuated troops, Yamashiro
decided to make a run for Rabaul. The withdrawal of the Japanese vessels spoiled Burke’s
torpedo attack so he led his ships in a chase of the Japanese force. The opposing forces
exchanged gunfire as they raced toward Rabaul. For some unknown reason, Burke led his ships
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in a sudden turn at 0245. Right after this course change several Japanese torpedoes exploded in
the ships’ wakes. The Americans had luckily avoided a deadly Japanese torpedo salvo. Finally,
Yamashiro ordered his three ships to flee in different directions. Instead of dispersing his own
force, Burke concentrated on what he perceived the largest Japanese ship to be and showered it
with shell fire. This ship, the luckless Yugiri, stopped dead in the water and sank about 0328.
Once the ships in Kagawa’s screen had been sunk, Austin joined in the chase with Burke.
The American forces tried to catch up with the remaining Japanese destroyers but to no avail.
By 0400, the American force had approached dangerously close to the Rabaul airbase.
Reluctantly, Burke called off the hunt and ordered his destroyers to head for their base. They
knew that a Japanese airstrike at dawn was certain so they called for help from Allied planes and
wearily watched the skies come dawn. Fortunately for the sailors, the only planes they saw were
American P-38 Lightning fighters.111
The Americans had sunk three Japanese destroyers while suffering only minimal damage.
It was a lopsided victory on the order of Vella Gulf and the Americans hailed it as one of the
Navy’s great moments. Above all other factors, radar gave the Americans an immense
advantage but other contributors should not be overlooked. The Americans had aggressive and
talented commanders who implanted a good tactical plan. On the other hand, the Japanese
showed a lack of innovation and could not cope with the American edge in radar. Harder to
quantify but necessary to discuss was the element of luck. Burke himself admitted that only
fortune enabled the Americans to arrive on scene exactly as Kagawa approached. In addition,
the Americans had great luck when Converse got hit by a dud torpedo and Burke made a
maneuver that avoided an enemy torpedo strike. The outcome of the battle could have been
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quite different. Yet, the end result was what mattered and the Americans could brag about
another success in nocturnal surface combat.112
The experiences of the American destroyers in these two battles illustrate how they
adapted tactics, technologies, and resources to improve their performance in the night surface
battles. The tactical plan worked out by Burke and others achieved success during the
Bougainville phase. Although the Americans implemented the plans imperfectly and also had to
rely on the whims of fortune to win the battles, the plans displayed a high degree of competence
and innovation in the naval officers. By this phase, a large portion of commanders who were
unsuited to combat command had been sifted out of combat commands. The ones who remained
such as Burke, Austin, and Merrill displayed effective combat leadership skills and tactical
competence. The Japanese, however, fought ferociously but displayed little tactical innovation.
In addition, commanders such as Omori at Empress Augusta Bay did not handle their forces well
in combat. They were either too reckless or too cautious and failed to devise strategies that could
overcome American advantages such as radar.
By this phase, American had vastly improved their mastery of radar. At night, American
planes equipped with radar constantly searched the seas and provided critical information on
Japanese ship movements to commanders such as Merrill and Burke. American ships now
possessed an IFF device on their air search radars that enabled them to determine friendly planes
from enemy bogies and also identified themselves to the planes. Unfortunately, an IFF device
for the SG surface search radar had not been developed so ships had no such way to determine
ally from enemy. Despite this limitation, the use of radar and related items such as the CIC gave
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the Americans a huge advantage in night fighting. In both of these battles, the use of radar gave
the Americans the element of surprise that enabled them to attain a favorable position prior to the
onset of battle. Overall, the benefits of radar cannot be overemphasized.
Another technological factor was the torpedoes. Not only had Americans solved their
own torpedo problems, but by this stage, they had finally realized the threat of the Japanese
torpedo. Merrill used this knowledge to great affect at Empress Augusta Bay when he
maintained his range and used radical course and speed changes to negate enemy torpedo
solutions. Burke also understood the threat of the enemy torpedo, but he and Austin were lucky
that they did not lose ships to torpedo attack at Cape St. George. Although Americans
understood the weapon better, it still had the capability to be lethal in combat.
Finally, Americans were able to use their resources better by this phase by keeping more
ships together as a unit. Burke’s Desdiv 45 had the time to train together with Merrill’s cruisers
before the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay and the entire Desron 23 operated together for several
weeks before the Cape St. George battle. This familiarity enabled them to formulate and adhere
to a specific doctrine which brought about good results in night battles. In contrast, Austin’s
Desdiv 46 did not have time to train together and experienced troubles at Empress Augusta Bay.
The mayhem resulting in the separation of Foote and the collision of the Spence and Thatcher
illustrated the confusion generated when ships unfamiliar with each other operated together at
night. The demands of war still pulled ship organizations apart, but unit coherence had improved
greatly since the Guadalcanal phase. The Japanese situation in this regard worsened. By
Bougainville, the losses in ships and men had placed a strain on the Japanese Navy. They pulled
ships from everywhere and often did not have time to train them as a unit. Omori’s force had not
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operated together and experienced great confusion at Empress Augusta Bay. He later listed this
as one of the great reasons for the Japanese defeat.113
Overall, the Americans had learned from their mistakes and had welded technology,
tactics, and resource use into a very effective weapon. They had not discovered a cure-all for
naval night combat but had developed a workable doctrine for use in the Solomon waters. The
battles fought during the Bougainville phase demonstrated American competence in nocturnal
surface warfare that helped alleviate the earlier humiliations at Guadalcanal and New Georgia.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
From the desperate weeks of the Guadalcanal campaign to the victorious days of the
Bougainville battles, the United States Navy greatly improved its performance in the nocturnal
surface battles. The little destroyers played a key role in this evolution and proved themselves to
be just as crucial to the war effort as the big battleships and aircraft carriers. By studying the
performance of the destroyers in these actions, three key factors emerge that contributed to the
eventual success of the American fleet: tactical innovation, use of resources, and adaption of
technology.
At the onset of the fighting, the Americans realized that their prewar plans based upon a
decisive naval battle in the open ocean were unsuited to the conditions in the Solomon Islands.
In addition, they realized that they faced a skilled and aggressive foe that could inflict heavy
losses upon its enemy. In a series of successes and setbacks through the Guadalcanal and New
Georgia campaigns at battles such as Cape Esperance, Tassafaronga, Vella Gulf, and Vella
Lavella, the United States Navy finally formulated a tactical formula that could achieve victory.
Although larger ships continued to play an important role, the destroyers emerged as a key
combatant. The final formula allowed destroyers to launch independent torpedo attacks on the
enemy. Instead of one ship formation, it called for multiple groups of ships to attack from
different flanks in order to keep the Japanese off balance and evade the deadly torpedo attacks.
The doctrine along with capable commanders and well-trained crews allowed the Americans to
win impressive victories during the Bougainville phase at Empress Augusta Bay and Cape St.
George.
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Along with tactics, Americans also improved their use of resources. They learned that
ships that trained together and operated as a unit performed better in combat than ships
assembled piecemeal from all directions. The Americans had a tendency, dictated by operational
needs, to constantly rotate ships in and out of task forces. Able to perform numerous tasks and
being in short supply, destroyers had a particularly hard time staying together as a unit because
commanders scattered them among various assignments. As more ships became available, this
problem lessened as the war progressed although it did not totally cease. An example of this
concept was Arleigh Burke’s Desron 23. Desron 23 operated together for a relatively lengthy
time throughout the Bougainville campaign. They became familiar with each others’ quirks and
standardized tactical and communication protocols. At Cape St. George, the ships fought very
well together and won a smashing victory as a result.
Finally, the Americans adapted technology to help them win these surface battles. The
critical technologies became torpedoes and radar. As the battles progressed, the United States
Navy overcame the problems with its own torpedoes such as faulty depth settings and defective
contact exploders and learned to be wary of the Japanese Long Lance torpedo. It took the
Americans a long time to realize the true potential of the Japanese torpedo. They suffered heavy
losses at battles such as Tassafaronga, Kolombangara, and Vella Lavella because of torpedo
attacks. Part of this problem was due to faulty intelligence and part to racist attitudes. Many
American naval experts refused to believe an oriental race could develop a better weapon than
the United States. Without question, the Japanese torpedo far outclassed its American
counterpart in range. Furthermore, the reload system developed by the Japanese Navy meant
that it could send large numbers of this lethal weapon against American ships. As a result, the
American Navy suffered more losses from this supposedly inferior race than against other foes.
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Fortunately for the American Navy, it finally realized the effectiveness of the Japanese torpedo
by the Bougainville phase and compensated for it by maintaining a healthy distance from the
enemy ships and conducting radical course and speed changes during battle. These methods
along with simple luck enabled them to avoid devastating losses during the final battles at
Bougainville.
Above all other factors, the technology of radar gave Americans the edge over the
Japanese. Early models of radar proved ineffective and American commanders did not
understand how to use it properly. After the introduction of the SG radar, however, the United
States Navy found radar to be a vital contribution to the war effort. It not only improved combat
operations but standard navigation as well. The use of the PPI scope, which made it easier for
operators to interpret the tactical situation, and the use of the CIC to coordinate information
made the SG radar a very effective tool in night surface actions. Not only was it used on ships,
but in airplanes as well. The efficient uses of this technology enabled the Americans to surprise
and defeat the Japanese at Vella Gulf, Empress Augusta Bay, and Cape St. George. The
advantage of radar cannot be overemphasized.
The American use of tactics, technology, and resources enabled the Navy to find a
workable solution to its problems of night combat in the Solomons. The Japanese, on the other
hand, failed to innovate their tactics, lacked the critical technology of radar, and used their own
resources poorly. The Japanese fought hard and with great skill, but their failure in the above
mentioned areas played a crucial role in their defeat. The Americans had not found some magic
cure-all for victory but displayed an ability to adapt and improvise in the rapidly changing
conditions of modern combat. During the days when they did not possess a preponderance of
power in men or materiel, this ability helped them win a very tough victory in the South Pacific.
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It would have been interesting to how the Japanese and Americans applied the lessons
learned in the Solomon Islands to later surface actions. By 1944, however, the character of the
war changed and it became dominated by the aircraft carrier and amphibious attack ship. The
phase of major nocturnal surface battles fought by cruiser-destroyer task forces had passed.
During the Leyte campaign, the Allies and Japanese did fight one more night surface action at
the Battle of Surigao Strait. A Japanese force of two battleships, one cruiser, and four destroyers
undertook a suicide mission to attack an Allied invasion force in Leyte Gulf. An overwhelming
American force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and even torpedo boats smashed the enemy
column as it steamed through Surigao Strait. Only one Japanese destroyer, the indefatigable
Shigure, survived the battle.114 The Americans performed well, but they also possessed a huge
advantage in numbers. As for the Japanese, they had little hope of reversing the American
advance in the Philippines and knew they would probably be annihilated. Overall, the action did
not possess the same significance as the battles fought in the Solomons. Yet, the lessons learned
during the Solomons phase of the war should not be neglected as useless artifacts from a bygone
era. Future conflicts will probably be of a different nature, but the basic concepts of tactical
innovation, adaption of technology, and use of resources could still play a vital role in
determining the victor. Who knows? Perhaps the versatile and efficient destroyer will again
play a key role in the naval battles of the future.

114
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